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Summary 
 
This master thesis examines trust relations in French and Norwegian organizations. Both 
relations between manager- employee and between employees are studied. Our research 
question is: 
How will the institutional environment and management style of the organization 
affect trust relations? 
We assumed that trust relations will differ in the two countries, and also the institutional 
environment and management style of the organization. To answer our research questions and 
assumptions adequately, we have chosen a theoretical framework consisting of trust, 
management, neo intuitionalism and rationality. Our research method is qualitative. We have 
interviewed six informants with work experience from both Norway and France. This was an 
important criterion, since they have qualified opinions about trust relations in French and 
Norwegian organizations, and are competent to make a comparison. The informants’ 
statements combined with existing literature from the field creates the basis for our analysis.  
Descriptions of work life in both countries are used to characterize the institutional 
environment and management style in Norway and France. These descriptions of the work 
life in the two countries are mainly concern cultural values, level of trust, labor legislation and 
the educational system. An examination of the French and Norwegian work life shows clear 
difference concerning these elements. We argue that this contribute to quite different 
management styles. We examined decision-making processes as we argue that trust relations 
and management style will be evident in these situations. Based on our findings, we made 
some specific assumptions concerning the level and form of trust relations in the two 
countries. These assumptions and findings are further analyzed trough transactional and 
transformational management and neo- institutionalism with a focus on Scott’s three pillars.   
Our main findings are: 
The decision-making processes in Norway and France show that the processes seem to be 
characterized by two different forms of rationality. It seems like low inclusion of employees 
and a strive for full rationality in French decision making processes, are caused by a low level 
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of trust in the organizations. On the other hand, the decision-making processes in Norwegian 
organizations are characterized by limited rationality. Decision-making was described as more 
pragmatic, open and risk seeking, which are all factors that indicate this form for rationality. 
The inclusion of employees and trade union representatives in decision-making processes are 
important conditions for trust to establish at higher levels. 
Our analysis shows that a transactional management contributes to trust relations 
characterized by calculus-based trust. It seems that one important condition for the 
development of trust – knowledge sharing - is almost absent in French organizations. The 
French organizations also appear to be characterized by impersonal trust. The conditions for 
development of trust are mainly present in the informal networks. Our analysis shows that it’s 
especially the openness, low power distance, employee participation and work processes in 
Norwegian organizations that stabilizes trust relations at a knowledge-based level, and in 
some cases at identification- based level. These elements will also enhance a personal form 
for trust. The logic of transactional and transformational management not only affects trust 
relations between managers and employees, but also the trust relations between employees. 
Lastly, our analysis shows that the organization itself sometimes function as a trust builder in 
France. The low level of trust creates a necessity for the organization to function as a third-
party guarantor. The mutual acceptance of the Model of Collaboration seems to be the third-
party guarantor in Norwegian organizations. Different expectations and acceptance 
concerning decision-making, working hours and level of inclusion between the countries are 
explained by different understanding of reality, and worlds-in-common.  
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Preface 
In November 2013, Aftenposten posted an article saying that Norway has a high level of trust 
in the society. They had conducted an experiment with “lost wallets”, where 15 out of 20 
wallets had been found and returned. The professors who were interviewed in the article 
stated that the high level of trust was also significant in the Norwegian work life, as it made 
processes more efficient. In contrast, countries with low levels of trust were described as quite 
inefficient as they need not only controllers to substitute for lack of trust, they also needed to 
control the controllers. The article refers to a research stating that Russia would have been at 
least 70 per cent richer if it had Norway’s level of trust. Trust is even referred to us Norway’s 
most important resource, before oil. 
This made us fairly interested in the concept of trust. We were at the time also self-declared 
Francophiles, after staying a semester in Paris. This was all the beginning of a (sometimes) 
long-lasting and exciting process.  
 
We would like to express our gratitude to those who has helped us on our journey. Jan Erik 
Strand has been of great help, collecting informants and putting us in touch with them. Thank 
you for all your help! We also wish to thank all of our informants who agreed to participate. 
Each and one of you have given us valuable information and interesting insights. We also 
wish to thank our families, who are always there when we need it and gives a helping hand. A 
very special thanks to our advisor Eivind Falkum, who not only guided us through the 
process, but also functioned as a “reserve dad” during our stay in Paris. Thank you for always 
being there for us, on Skype and mail, whenever we needed it. Our thesis wouldn’t have 
ended up as it did without you. Endless thanks! Lastly we want to thank the lovely city of 
Paris who put a smile on our faces every time the thesis seemed hopeless. It has been 
invaluable for us to write in the Parisian surroundings. What a beautiful place to be distracted 
from time to time! 
Merci à tous! 
Ingvild Vårdal Bredesen & Emilie Kristine Andreassen 
  Paris, May 2014 
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1 Introduction 
Trust between people and its significance to society have been a subject of attention for 
philosophers for several centuries. Still, trust is a term which is difficult to analytically 
capture in an unambiguously way. Whatever definition you choose, you will lose some 
central dimensions to its meaning. Thus, the term trust holds ambiguous meaning (Sørhaug, 
1996). It creates conditions for, and mobilizes action and cooperation. It consists of mutual 
expectations that have not yet been realized, which means that the expectations are keeping 
trust alive. It is impossible to use up trust, as the consumption of trust usually just creates 
more trust (Sørhaug, 1996). The descriptions of trust are both interesting and challenging.  
 
1.1 Why Is Trust Important?  
 
In recent time, the concept of trust has been studied in different various disciplines like 
phycology, social science, sociology, economy, anthropology and jurisprudence (Skirbekk, 
2012, p. 20). In social science, trust is described as a social phenomenon, which is supposed 
to make work in organizations easier. This is especially true in a world with increasing 
uncertainty, complexity, flat hierarchies, more participative management style and increased 
professionalism. Trust is said to be better at controlling life in organizations than hierarchical 
power, or direct surveillance (Sydow, 1998, p.31).  
 
As organizational researchers only recently became interested in trust, there is currently a lack 
of detailed analysis of trust processes between people within organizations. The fact that trust 
may differ systematically across cultures is also a field researchers barely have begun to 
explore (S, Zaheer, & A, Zaheer, 2006). Still, several definitions and perspectives are already 
established. According to Lewicki & Bunker (1996), trust is a critical success element to most 
business, professional and employment relationships. Trust is also central to all transaction 
(Dasgupta, 1988). Limerick & Cunnington argue: 
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Trust lubricates the smooth, harmonious functioning of the organization by 
eliminating the friction and minimizing the need for bureaucratic structures that 
specify the behavior of participation who do not trust each other. But trust does not 
come naturally. It has to be carefully structured and managed (1993, pp. 95-96 ref. in 
Lewicki & Bunker, 1996, p. 115).  
 
We believe that a comparison of trust relations in different countries will bring a deeper 
understanding of the subject at hand. Comparison is such a natural part of analytical work that 
it’s often taken for granted (Album, Widerberg & Hansen, 2010). After spending a semester 
abroad in Paris, we were both intrigued by what at first glance appeared like two countries 
with cultural similarities, actually turned out to be quite different in some respect. We decided 
to use France and Norway as basis for a comparison in our thesis, as some significant and 
interesting differences would be useful to analyze further to enlighten our personal 
observations. The fact that little comparative research exists about trust relations in 
organizations also inspired us to conduct the present research. Even though there is not much 
comparative research conducted between France and Norway, it is still clear that the countries 
present two quite different national typologies (Melle, 2012). Melle (2012) suggests using the 
terms civil society and governmentality for which nation building has been bottom-up in the 
former, and top down in the latter. Channels of influence from the lower classes of society 
and up did not exist in France, while these have been characteristic for Norwegian history and 
culture (Melle, 2012). What took us by surprise when learning more about France was its low 
level of trust. Only 19 per cent of the population seems to believe that “most people are 
trustworthy”, compared to 74 per cent in Norway (World Values Survey, 2006). Trust 
relations are not straight forward, and to obtain a deeper insight we therefore want to see trust 
relations in French organization in the light of trust relations in Norway to know what 
characterize it and vice versa.  
 
Equality has been declared as Norwegian culture’s most prominent value (Kalleberg, 1992, 
Lindqvist, 1988, Schramm-Nielsen et al., 2004 ref. in Grenness, 2012). It is expressed in for 
example tax systems, education politics, wage determination procedures and recruitment 
action procedures. The ideal of equality is visible in every part of the society, also 
management (Grenness, 2012). As a result of this equality, Norwegian managers are said to 
have an aversion to hierarchies, strong confidence in colleagues and a consistently skepticism 
3 
 
towards the use of formal rules and procedures (Smith et al., 1996 ref. in Grenness, 2012). We 
argue that equality also facilitates for trust (Eriksen, 2012). The democratization of work life 
will require more equality with respect to rights and regulations.  In contrast, French society is 
permeated with values related to elitism, hierarchism and centralistic thinking Melle (2012), 
which make a study of trust particularly relevant.  
 
1.2 The Study’s Mandate   
Our research question is: 
How will the institutional environment and management style of the organization 
affect trust relations? 
We want to examine trust relations between both manager- employees and trust relations 
between the employees in French and Norwegian organizations. We have three overall 
assumptions: 
1. We assume that trust relations will be different in French and Norwegian 
organizations. 
2. We assume the institutional environment and management style will differ in French 
and Norwegian organizations. 
3. Trust in its daily connotation will be of less importance in French organizations than 
in Norwegians.   
 
These assumptions will be addressed implicitly throughout the thesis, without being directly 
referred to. Together they will lie as a foundation, and guide the discussions.  
Our arguments concerning the characteristics of institutional environment and management 
style in France and Norway are based on an examination of the countries work life. We will 
examine decision-making processes in both countries. We assume that the characteristics of 
management style and trust relations will be most evident in these situations. Based on our 
literature findings and discussions with our supervisor, it appears reasonable to make 
specified assumptions, as given above, about potential differences in Norwegian and French 
work life related to both type of trust and levels of trust in the organizations. Management 
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theories applied will be concerned with the distinction of transactional and transformational 
management. Neo institutionalism will be used to investigate why certain aspects are 
explained as simply “the way things are done around here”. 
 
1.3 The Study’s Limitations and Purposes 
We do not under any circumstances believe that this study captures a complete picture of trust 
relations in Norway and France. The scope of the study limits us to simply provide a glance 
over the phenomenon, - we simply want to shed some light on trust relations and how they 
may differ in different cultures. As mentioned, trust has only been under the scholars loop in 
recent years, especially in sociology (Luhmann, 1988) and organizational literature 
(Nooteboom & Six, 2003).  We wish to broaden the readers understanding of the phenomenon 
and highlight some possible conditions that may affect these trust relations.  
 
We realize that other theoretical approaches could have been just as appropriate as the ones 
we have chosen, to answer our mandate in an adequate way. An example of such is theories 
of power, which could have been used as a framework. It may seem reckless to not include 
Bourdieu’s theories of power and structuralism when writing about French organizations. 
Nevertheless, we have not devoted attention to his research because the scope of the thesis 
requires prioritizing and focus. See for example Bourdieu (1989), Nooteboom & Six (2003) 
and Skjøtt-Larsen & Henriksen (2012) for further reading about Bourdieu’s approaches. We 
have neither chosen to devote focus to the role of time or history. The historical aspect is a 
relevant explanatory factor when examining the characteristics of work life. It would make an 
interesting examination, but because of the scoop of this thesis we thought it was too 
comprehensive. We want to point out to the readers that the notion of time is a central aspect 
in trust relations. For further reading, see Lewicki & Bunker (1996).  We also realize that the 
theories we have chosen are both comprehensive and complex, which is why we have chosen 
some parts and perspectives of them. Another limitation is that during the work process we 
discovered that many of our descriptions, particularly of France, have been rather critical. 
Based on our research questions, our informants have given us emotional and engaging 
answers that we have chosen to build our analysis on.  
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1.4 The Study’s Disposal  
The study starts with an introduction to our chosen theoretical frameworks. Theories of trust, 
management, neo intuitionalism and decision-making, as well as rationality, are all included. 
We find it necessary to use parts of all of them, as the ability to use several approaches to one 
mandate may enhance the discussion, and later the conclusions. Further, in chapter 3, we will 
present our method and procedures. We will reflect around the working process, and point out 
possible shortcomings and vulnerabilities with our conducted research. Chapter 4 will give a 
short and concise description of what we consider the most influential aspects of work life in 
respectively Norway and France. We will end the chapter with a description of management 
style from both countries, which is based on the descriptions of the work life. In chapter 5 we 
present our main findings from our interviews, mainly concerned with processes of decision-
making. We have tied the findings and quotes with existing literature from the decision-
making field and rationality in order to enhance the statements. In the end of the chapter, we 
provide some assumptions on how trust relations are evident in the described decision-
making. We also present a model, made to illustrate some assumptions about trust. Chapter 6 
builds on the main conclusions from chapter 5, and uses theories of transactional and 
transformational management in order to advance the discussion. Transactional and 
transformational will be used as a framework to examine how management affects trust 
relations in organizations. The discussion will mainly be concerned with the relations between 
employee and managers, but we will also show the impact of employee-employee relations. 
Chapter 7 will maintain the discussions presented that far, and integrate it in a neo 
institutional framework. Scott’s three pillars of institutions will be used primarily to give 
reason to behavior and actions. Lastly, chapter 8 will provide a summarized conclusion, with 
a proposal to integrate our theoretical approaches.    
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2 Theory 
This chapter will provide an overview of our theoretical framework. The theories will be used 
in subsequent chapters to interpret our findings from our research and existing literature.  
 
2.1 Trust 
The question about what trust is may seem obvious (Skirbekk, 2012), but it is a complex 
concept to define (Kristiansen, 2012). Sørhaug (1996) enhances this complexity when he 
states that no matter how you define trust, you will always loose some central dimensions. It’s 
hard to grasp it analytically in an unambiguous way (Sørhaug, 1996). Thus, the definitions of 
trust strongly vary among the literature, not only in general, but also within different fields of 
research (Zucker, 1986). The ones we have chosen to look at are primarily used in 
organization theories.  
 
Some theorists suggest dividing trust in different forms. Bachmann (2003) states that the 
theoretical literature makes an important distinction between personal and impersonal trust. 
The concept of personal trust comes close to the ordinary connotation of trust. The daily 
proximity of workplace in organizations can be seen to develop this form for trust, through 
face- to- face contact between individuals. The latter concerns trust in the field of 
organizational relations. It is again divided in two, trust in systems of cultural or institutional 
trust, and how individuals trust each other in the face of the structural arrangements around 
them (Bachmann, 2003). System trust that exists within organizations builds on the authority 
attributed to the formal social positions as well as on the reliability of technical systems, 
standards and procedures. Institutional trust draws on institutionalized patterns of the 
divisions of work duties and responsibility, as well as other elements of the structural 
inventory of the organizations to which individual actors have to orient their expectations 
when interacting with one other. This kind of trust is in principle produced within the 
boundaries of the organization. It can thus vary greatly from organization to organization 
(Bachmann, 2003). In contrast, system trust is mostly a phenomenon, which originates in the 
external environment and reaches into the internal world of the organization. It can be 
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assumed that external environment also has a strong impact on the conditions under which 
institutional trust is generated within the organization. We will mainly be concerned with the 
distinction of personal and impersonal trust in our study, as we do not believe our analysis 
require the clear distinction of system and institutional. This would be in accordance with 
Guldbrandsen’s (2012) thoughts, as he describes system and institutional trust as trust to the 
organization itself, its resources, management philosophy, the quality control systems, the 
employees’ competence etc.  
 
2.1.1 A Three-Level Model of Trust 
Other theorists look at how trust develops over time. Lewicki & Bunker (1996) wish to 
explore how trust is developed, sustained and repaired in professional work relationship. They 
present a three-level model, based on earlier work of Shapiro, Sheppard & Cheraskin (1992, 
ref. in Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) where trust dynamics are different at each level. Lewicki & 
Bunker (1996) stress this dynamic phenomenon, as trust should not be viewed as a static 
element. The first level of trust is called calculus-based trust. It mainly describes a 
relationship between managers and employees based on deterrence, where trust becomes 
visible in rewards and punishments. It’s based on assuring consistency of behavior, people 
will do what they say because they are afraid of possible consequences if they don’t (Lewicki 
& Bunker, 1996). Reputation is of specific concern; the threat that if trust is violated, one’s 
reputation can be hurt through a network of associates and friends. Having a reputation for 
honesty, especially for businesspeople is a valuable asset. Lewicki & Bunker (1996) apply the 
game “chutes and ladders” as a metaphor to illustrate the growth of calculus-based trust. 
Progress is made slowly, and only a single event of inconsistency might take actors way back. 
Thus, trust at this level is partial and fragile (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).  
 
The second level of trust is called knowledge-based trust. It’s grounded in predictability, that 
you have enough information about the other actor in order to anticipate his actions. It differs 
from the first level as it relies on knowledge, not deterrence (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). The 
main mechanism is how predictability contributes to trust. Regular communication and 
courtship are key processes, as it keeps parties in constant contact with each other. You learn 
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about wants, preferences and approaches, and develop an ability to think alike, which again 
leads to predictability. Trust is not necessarily broken by inconsistent behavior, as long as that 
behavior is expected (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).  
 
The last level is called identification-based trust. It concerns how you identify with other’s 
desires and intentions. Trust exists because you understand and appreciate each other’s wants 
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). A mutual understanding is developed, which makes you able to 
act on another party’s behalf. There is no need to monitor the other’s behavior, as you are 
confident that your interests will be protected and shared. You will also understand what to do 
in order to sustain each other’s trust. To commit to commonly shared values and objectives is 
essential, as you develop the same way of thinking, feeling and responding (Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1996).  
 
2.2 Management Theory 
We have chosen management theory in order to explain in detail how managers operate and 
interact. Sørhaug (2004) states that management is permeated with constraints and 
oppositions, both in theory and practice. Examples of such are emotions and reason, 
individual and institution, and not at least power and trust. Through these characteristics, a 
manager seeks to accomplish something via followers and subordinates (Sørhaug, 2004). 
They are responsible for the delegation of tasks, responsibility, information and resources 
(Hagen & Trygstad, 2007). How these delegations are made will influence organizational 
structure, and the other way around. Management is also a pattern of authority, which arises 
from an organization’s reality, especially the inner reality (Sørhaug, 2004). We see that 
concrete processes of management are complex, interactive, open, and sensitive to context 
(Sørhaug, 2004). They interact with other actors within an institutional framework of rules 
and regulations (Hagen & Trygstad, 2007). This mentioned context is not limited only to the 
organizations; also norms, requirements and expectations from the society will affect 
management (Hagen & Trygstad, 2007).  
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2.2.1 Transactional and Transformational Management 
A lot of the modern literature concerning management theory is addressing the distinction 
between transactional and transformational management (Judge & Piccolo, 2004). In his 
article from 1990, Bass elaborates on his thoughts on manager and employee relationships, 
conceptualized and modified by James Burns’ originally work (Judge & Piccolo, 2004).  
Bass defines transactional management as mainly an exchange or transaction, where the 
manager either rewards or punishes his employees, depending on their performance. As 
Sørhaug (2004) points out, the transactions create a mutual dimension, but are not necessarily 
equal. There are three main dimensions that characterize a transactional manager, mainly 
contingent reward, management-by-exception – active, and management-by-exception – 
passive (Bass, 1990, Judge & Piccolo, 2004). Contingent reward is characterized by contracts 
exchange of rewards of effort, promise of reward for good performance, and recognition 
(Bass, 1990). Management-by-exception is, in general, about the degree to which a manager 
takes corrective action. The difference between active and passive lies in the timing of the 
manager’s intervention – the active monitors behavior, search for deviation and take action 
before a behavior creates any harm (Avolio, 1993, ref. in Judge & Piccolo, 2004). The passive 
simply waits and intervenes only if standards are not met (Bass, 1990). If they are not met, 
managers may punish employees by threat or discipline. Bass (1990) states that transactional 
management, although sometimes effective, is not always sufficient. This is especially true if 
the manager performs management-by-exception – passive (Bass, 1990).  
 
Transformational management is often summarized in four dimensions or characteristics 
(Judge & Piccolo, 2004, Bass, 1990, Warrilow, 2012 ref. in Odumeru & Ifeanyi, 2013). They 
are charisma or idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and 
individual stimulation (Judge & Piccolo, 2004). In short, the charisma or idealized influence 
is to what degree the manager acts in admirable ways and inspires the employees to follow. 
Charismatic managers appeal to their followers on an emotional level (Judge & Piccolo, 
2004). Inspirational motivation is about motivating followers to share a vision, provide 
optimism about future goals, and provide meaning about tasks at hand (Warrilow, 2012, ref. 
in Odumeru & Ifeanyu, 2013, Judge & Piccolo, 2004). Intellectual stimulation is about 
challenging assumptions, take risks, and stimulate and encourage creativity. Managers do it 
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by providing a framework for their followers, to connect them to managers, the organization 
and projects (Warrilow, 2012, ref. in Odumeru & Ifeanyu, 2013, Judge & Piccolo 2004). The 
last one, individualized consideration is about seeing each follower and his needs, listen to his 
concerns and acts as a mentor (Judge & Piccolo, 2004).  
 
2.3 Institutional Theory  
To further answer our mandate in an adequate way, we have chosen an institutional theory 
framework. As both Scott (2008) and DiMaggio & Powell (1991) acknowledge, the theories 
and arguments discussed in the large field of institutionalism are strikingly diverse. There are 
not only differences – also similarities are resting on varied assumptions. In this jungle of 
theories and approaches, we have chosen to look at Scott’s three pillars of institution and neo 
institutionalism. We believe they suit our study, as they examine the social aspects and the 
“alive” in organizations (Scott, 2008). In order to make sense of those theories, we will 
introduce some general notions of institutionalism.   
 
Institutionalism seeks to explain how and why people act, both in formal and informal ways 
(Scott, 2008)
1
. What is accepted as rational may also be in the informal. It is norms, values 
and attitudes. An actor’s action will be affected by context and the organization it is a part of; 
they become institutionalized (Scott, 2008). Institutionalization is a phenomenological 
process, where social relationships and actions are taken for granted, as well as shared 
cognition, which define what actions that are possible (Zucker, 1983, p. 2 ref. in DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991). Scott (2008) emphasizes how institutions constrain, control and encourage 
behavior. It creates legal, moral and cultural boundaries, as well as empowering activities and 
actors. “Institutions provide stimulus, guidelines, and resources for acting as well as 
prohibitions and constraints on action.” (Scott, 2008, p. 58)  
 
These taken-for-grandness further explains how “actors associate certain actions with certain 
situations by rules of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1984, p. 741 ref. in DiMaggio & 
                                                 
1
 We don’t find it necessary to elaborate on the historic development of institutionalism. See 
Scott (2008). 
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Powell, 1991), which is absorbed through socialization, education, on-the-job experience etc. 
Thus, institutionalism will help us explain why there might be differences in organizational 
structure and work life in Norway and France.  
 
2.3.1 Neo Institutionalism 
Neo institutionalism was introduced in the 1970s. It is not clearly separated from 
institutionalism, but has some new insights (Scott, 2008, DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). It 
emphasizes cognitive patterns and meaning, and looks more closely at the field and context 
around the organization as well (Scott, 2008). As opposed to institutionalism, which seeks 
answers to why inequality is created, neo institutionalism seeks to understand why so many 
organizations resemble.  
It is questioned whether you can properly understand individual choices and preferences 
without the cultural framework in which they are embedded (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Neo 
institutionalism;   
…emphasizes the ways in which action is structured and order made possible by 
shared systems of rules that both constrain the inclination and capacity of actors to 
optimize as well as privilege some groups whose interests are secured by prevailing 
rewards and sanctions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 11).   
 
Both old and neo institutionalism are concerned with environment. But as the old tradition 
primarily focused on local environment, neo focuses on sectors or fields as profession or 
industry, or national societies. Thus, environments are more subtle in their influence – they 
create the lenses which actors see the world, structures, action and thought, by penetrating the 
organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). It is the organizational form, structural components 
and rules that are institutionalized – not the organization as a unit.  
Neo institutionalism is not as concerned with norms and values as a cognitive frame, they are 
more facts in which actors must take into account. According to the theory, taken-for-granted 
scripts, rules and classifications are what institutions are made of.  
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2.3.2 Scott: Three Pillars of institutions 
In order to encompass the existing variety and achieve certain clarity, Scott proposes broad 
definitions of institutions. He suggests,  
“Institutions comprise regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to 
social life “. Scott (2008, p. 56) 
Scott identifies three analytic elements that comprise institutions, which have all been vital in 
defining them, - together they are the building blocks in institutional structure. It is possible to 
look at them as mutual dependent, but also separately, as they have some important 
differences (Scott, 2008). Scott underlines that these differences provide different 
explanations on how actors make choices, the extent to which actors are rational, and what 
rationality really is – they offer a different rationale for legitimacy, either by virtue of being 
legally sanctioned, morally authorized, or culturally supported (Scott, 2008). 
 
 
           Table from Scott (200, p. 51) 
 
In cultural-cognitive systems, routines and rules are followed simply because “that’s the way 
we do things around here”. Scott emphasizes that neo institutionalism is quite close to this 
pillar, regarding shared perceptions, language and understanding.  
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2.4 Decision-making and Rationality 
Decision-making occurs in every organization, and it varies in different matters of shape, size 
and importance. It is a lengthy process, from intention to result, or as Schramm-Nielsen 
suggests – from a problem has been perceived until action has been taken to solve it 
(Schramm-Nielsen, 2001). It is a process with different stages, which is affected by many 
factors. For example, Erez (1993) looks at society and culture and how it affects decision-
making. She states that cultural and societal values will affect what is the most affective in 
managerial practices, thus also decision-making. Erez (1993) exemplifies, stating that 
societies with collective cultural values probably appreciate group decisions. This will be 
further evident in chapter 5. 
 
Decision-making is often presented with theories of rationality, as rationality is a way to 
attribute meaning to behavior (Weber ref. in Scott, 2008). “Theorists make different 
assumptions regarding how actors make choices: what logics determine social action” (Scott, 
2008, p. 66). March (1994) implies that there are two different ways to study rationality. One 
is the old traditional way, which interprets action and behavior as pure rational choice. It 
might be explained as how decisions ought to happen. In more modern theories of rationality, 
research has been more focused on how decisions actually happen. That leads to the idea of 
limited rationality, as perfect rationality is impossible to achieve. It requires more than what 
humans can concur; we are limited by cognition, information and knowledge about future 
outcomes. Both March (1994) and Scott (2008) propose that ideas of rationality are difficult 
to integrate in a sociological perspective, as it looks at behavior purely as calculus of costs 
and benefits. Still, we will use March’s descriptions and divisions of the two different types of 
rationality as they differ as ideals. Weber actually distinguished rationality in goal and value 
oriented rationality, or Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität (Scott, 2008, p. 68), in order to 
broaden the view and overcome the issues from an institutional perspective (Scott, 2008). The 
former looks at action that is rational in an instrumental and calculative sense, it focuses on 
means-ends connections. The latter is action that is inspired by and directed toward the 
realization of substantive values, social and cultural, for instance morale and normative 
distribution of wealth; it focuses on ends pursued (Weber, 1924/1968, p. 24 ref. in Scott, 
2008, p. 68).   
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Also Zucker has interesting ideas of rationality in organizational theory (1986, ref. in Scott, 
2008). She (1986) states that rational bureaucratic structures in organizations were created in 
a time where trust was difficult to attain. Organizational complexity and high amount of 
immigrants made closeness and cultural heterogeneity inefficient as trust builders. Rational 
structures with written rules, legislation and procedures were supposed to secure that people 
did what they were supposed to do. 
  
2.5 Summarizing  
Theories have several roles to play in science (Bordens & Abott, 2011, p. 43). We want to use 
these theories to create an understanding of the trust relations in the organizations in the two 
different countries. We also want to use these theories to create a framework for 
interpretations of our data from our interviews. It is on the bases of our mandate that we have 
chosen these theories. We want to examine decision-making processes since trust relations 
will be at it most evident in these situations. We find it necessary to include both management 
and neo institutionalism because they mutually affect and influence each other. These theories 
will together show how organizations affect trust relations in the two countries. Since we have 
chosen two countries to compare, we believe that management theories, neo institutionalism 
and especially Scott’s three pillars can be used to adequately explain the possible differences 
or similarities between them. Rationality will be used as a way to attribute meaning to 
different forms of behavior, which we will show by examining decision-making processes.  
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3 Method 
The nature of our research question made the qualitative method the most adequate choice. 
Trust relations are complex concepts and the qualitative method is well suited to study 
complex relations in social and cultural context (Grimen, 2004). In addition, we seek 
informants’ descriptions, personal experiences and opinions about trust relations in 
Norwegian and French organizations, which the qualitative method is appropriate for (Grimen 
2004). According to Grimen (2004), qualitative research focuses on the relationship between 
human actions and the different contexts these actions take place within. In this chapter, we 
want to reflect around our methodological choice and decisions that we have made during the 
process of conducting this research. The choice of work procedure, recruitment of informants, 
how the interviews were conducted and our experiences from this process will be discussed, 
followed by reflections concerning our role as researches.  
We found it most adequate to write a theoretical thesis “spiced with empiry”. A combination 
of a theoretical and empirical approach allowed us to conduct our own small research, and 
anchor it in existing theory.  
 
3.1 Working Together  
To collaborate on such a comprehensive study can be both a challenge and a benefit. We have 
worked together in a previous project, which means we had some knowledge about each 
other’s working habits and routines before we got started with this study. The most 
challenging part of working together was in the beginning, when we had to find a subject we 
both had a genuine interest in. Later, we had to obtain a mutual understanding of what was 
relevant and not. We have throughout the whole process worked closely together, but 
independently. The work process has been characterized by fruitful discussion and consulting 
the other party. We have always come to an agreement on different subjects, as we both have 
a mentality that only convincing arguments should be used to break through with opinions. 
Therefore, we look at our cooperation as a possibility to challenge each other and get 
feedback on own ideas, which have strengthened our learning as well as the quality of the 
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working process. We have different backgrounds from our Bachelor degrees, which has 
enabled us to see different connections, aspects and to supplement each other.   
 
3.2 Informants 
To find our informants, we contacted Chambre de Commerce Franco- Norvégienne (the 
French- Norwegian Chamber of Commerce) and joined their Young Chamber Club. Through 
this membership we were invited to the Chambers events and had access to the contact 
information to both the members and the member organizations. By active networking at one 
of the Chamber’s events, we made contact with two persons from Norwegian trade companies 
who helped us with getting in touch with the first informants. The process from here to 
locating all the informants can be characterized as a “snowball method”. The snowball 
method means that you pick someone with the right characteristic, and through their 
recommendations find other subjects with the same characteristics (Gobo, 2004). Our contact 
persons from the Chamber’s event put us in contact with people they knew, and these people 
put us in contact with someone they thought would be relevant. The ball started rolling and 
we ended up with a total of six relevant informants.  
3.2.1 Informant Criteria 
To find relevant informants who were suitable to our study was a very important task. When 
we started searching for these informants, we had a few criteria they had to fulfil. Work 
experience from both the countries was our main criteria, because of their ability to make a 
qualified comparison as well as personal experiences from both countries. Another criterion 
was that the organization they had worked for in France was French owned. The reason for 
this was that we wanted to ensure that the management style and the organizational 
environment were affected and shaped by the work life in France, and not by foreign owners. 
We also decided to interview only men for practical matters. Lastly, we looked for informants 
that had experience from the same industry to exclude possible explanatory factors that may 
differ between industries. This turned out to be a great challenge. Most of our informants had 
work experience from the oil and gas industry in France, but their experience in Norwegian 
industry sectors varied more.  
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3.2.2 Our Informants 
Following is a short description of background and work experiences of our informants: 
Informant 1: Have a Master of Business and Economics. He is a project manager for 
connected services in a company in the automobile industry. He has worked in France since 
2012. Earlier, he worked some years in Denmark for the same company, and in Norway as a 
controller in a pharmacy company.  
Informant 2: He started working in Paris when the company he worked for was bought by an 
international French owned consulting company. He worked in France from 2002- 2006, 
where he was executive director for human resources. He currently works in human resources 
in one of Norway’s biggest educational establishments.  
Informant 3: Worked as an engineer in a French oil company from 1984-1987. From 1990-
1991 he was head of department at a French laboratory. He currently works in a Norwegian 
oil company as a specialist reservoir technology.  
Informant 4: Spent four years in Paris, working for a French oil company with the 
responsibility for North- America. He currently works for the same company as Commercial 
Director, stationed in Norway.  
Informant 5: Has a PhD in engineering. He has worked for 23 years in a Norwegian oil 
company, where he also was in the corporate management. Started to work for a French 
electricity and natural gas energy Service Company in Norway. Worked in France since 
December 2011 where he has been Deputy CEO for 3.5 years for a subsidiary company (30 
per cent Chinese owned, 70 per cent French owned) of a French oil and gas company.   
Informant 6: He has a master in computer science and MBA from a French University. He 
also went to primary school in France. He has had several engagements in France, but never 
worked in a French organization. Since 2013, he has worked as an independent consultant, 
and was earlier a chairman of Boards of Directors in a Norwegian renewable company.  
Informant 6 has only experience from the educational system in France. We discussed if we 
should interview him despite his lack of French work life experience. We decided to conduct 
the interview based on the recommendation and because of his valuable insight, as well as his 
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personal experiences of the French educational system and culture. As will be shown later, the 
French educational system is relevant for our discussion.  
 
3.3 The Qualitative Interview 
During our first interview, we experienced that the informant didn’t quite grasp what we 
actually were looking for. We felt that his descriptions were outside of our field. We quickly 
realized that we needed to ensure that the informants got a clear understanding of our research 
in advance of the interview. Therefore, we sent out an email prior to every interview with 
some questions from the interview guide that captured the essence of our subject. We had 
only positive experiences of doing this. Several of the informants had printed out the 
questions, taken notes and given the subject serious thoughts. We believe that this made the 
interviews more fruitful and we received a better quality of the information, since the 
informants had a chance to reflect in advance around the subject. They justified their 
arguments with concrete episodes and experiences, which they might have forgotten without 
time to evaluate the topics first. The first interview unintendedly became more of a test 
interview. In the same email sent prior to interviews, we also guarantied the informants’ 
anonymity, and asked for permission to tape the interview.  
 
We were both present under all the interviews; one led the interview while the other took 
notes. At the end of every interview the one who took notes would ask some additional 
questions if considered necessary. We shared the roles between us equally; the one that had 
led the last interview took notes on the next interview and vica versa. It was also important for 
us to be both present at every interview in order to secure a mutual understanding of the 
topics discussed, and to develop a similar overall impression of the informants’ descriptions. 
We obtained an agreement from the informants to record every interview and transcribed 
them after. This was very useful since we have used statements from the informants 
frequently in this study. Four of the interviews were done over Skype. We didn’t experience 
any extra challenges by having the interview over Skype instead of a face-to-face interviews. 
Instead, it made it easier to schedule and carry out the interview. The interviews over Skype 
were also a bit more relaxed compared to the other interviews. This could have been because 
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the interview took place in an informal setting; both the informant and the two of us were at 
home during the Skype interview. The face-to-face interviews were conducted at the work 
place of the informants.  
 
3.3.1 Semi-Structured Interview Guide  
We read thoroughly about our subjects before we conducted the interviews. It was important 
that we used the theory studied in the research processes to be able to use the interviews to 
obtain relevant information, , both prior and after the interviews. An interview can be done in 
many ways that will imply different forms of knowledge (Widerberg, 2010). We chose a 
semi-structured interview guide. This form for interview is maybe the most common in the 
qualitative method and it enables us to be flexible, both to what the informants invite to and 
the context (Ryen, 2002). We had certain topics we wanted every informant to elaborate on 
concerning both countries, namely: work life, management styles, trade unions, decision-
making processes and trust. Our questions were based on the theories we had studied during 
our preparatory work, which shaped the interview guide in order to secure a fruitful work 
concerning our subject (Widerberg, 2010). We asked relatively open questions and let the 
informants speak freely. It was interesting to hear what the informants emphasized and 
considered the most important. Widerberg (2010) argues that if the researcher is able to obtain 
differences and broadness in the interviews, thereby specify the findings, it can increase the 
validity of the results. We did not emphasize on the informants as persons, but focused on 
their knowledge and experiences of trust relations in Norwegian and French organizations. 
Disengaging knowledge from the source made our study less sensitive to the informants 
(Widerberg 2010). We believe this could be a reason for the engagement and talkativeness of 
our informants.  
 
3.4 Possible Pitfalls 
There are some weaknesses by using interview as a method. We want to reflect around some 
of the weaknesses that are the most relevant for our research design. Firstly, we transcribed 
every interview, but a transcription of the interview can never mirror the actual interview 
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(Willig, 2008, p. 27). Also, all the interviews were conducted in Norwegian, which means that 
all the quotes we have used, have been translated. Even though we have tried to translate the 
quotes as accurate as possible, it is a risk that these translations have been affected by our own 
understanding of the informants’ statements.  
Interviewing managers can involve some additional challenges. They are often people with a 
tight schedule so they might have few incentives to save time for an outsider (Engelstad, 
2011). We believe that because we used the snowball method, the managers actually got an 
incentive to participate in our research as they were contacted by someone they knew. We 
didn’t have any problems to arrange the interview after we first made contact. The informants 
even said we could contact them if we had more questions or concerns. Engelstad (2011) 
argues that in an interview situation, it’s often emphasized that the interviewer has more 
power than the one who’s being interviewed. But when interviewing a person in an elite- or 
top position, this relationship can be inverted; the informant is the one who holds most control 
in the interview position. In some of the interviews, we experienced that the informant was at 
the borderline between being the one with the control, and simply elaborating freely (as we 
hoped with the unstructured interview guide). We did not consider it to be a problem. 
 
3.4.1 Validity  
We would like to reflect around parts of our study that may concern the research validity. 
Internal validity is the ability of research’s design to test the hypothesis that it was design to 
test (Bordens &Abbott, 2011). We have examined trust relations in both French and 
Norwegian organizations, but all our informants are Norwegians. It could be that the 
informants’ reflections concerning trust relations in France are seen from a “Norwegian 
perspective”. The possibility of our informants having an ethnocentric perspective is therefore 
present. This could contribute to a bias picture of the relations in the two countries. This was 
important for us to have in mind when we interpreted their statements so the biased selection 
of subjects didn’t threat the internal validity (Bordens &Abbott, 2011). It is important for us 
as researcher to have in mind that the social worlds of our informants have already been 
interpreted by them. This is defined as double hermeneutic, as we are interpreting something 
that has already been interpreted once (Giddens, 1984, ref. in Fangen, 2009). Also, we had 
some challenges concerning relevant literature. It was easy to find literature and earlier 
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research about Norwegian work life and management/ organizations. It was more problematic 
for us to collect data and literature concerning the French work life and organizations / 
management. As neither of us speaks French (at least not at a high enough level), and the fact 
that most of the relevant literature was in French, it was challenging to collect as much 
information compared to Norway. In order to try to balance the asymmetry in information 
from literature, we made the informants talk a bit more about France than Norway. 
Validity also concerns whether the informants identifies with the results or not. That’s not to 
say that research should be used as a “microphone” for certain groups, or that fronting their 
truth will strengthen validity (Widerberg, 2010, p. 231). We have interpreted the data from the 
interviews and used our own “voice” to add meaning to the informants’ statement within our 
theoretical framework. It is important that both the researcher and the informant’s voice are 
expressed, as possible divergence between them may be problematic. The whole point of 
professionals interpreting interviews, or us “adding our voice” in this thesis, is that it can add 
understanding to social phenomenon, and give the informants a deeper understanding of their 
own situation (Widerberg, 2010). We argue that being two researchers strengthen the study’s 
validity. To be two in the work of interpreting reduces the chance for error in judgment of the 
informants’ statements.  
 
3.4.2 Reliability 
In qualitative method, the studies’ reliability is ensured through the studies’ credibility or 
trustworthiness. It is important to reflect around the choices made throughout the whole 
process such as used methods, documentation of data and the final result, in order to secure 
high level of credibility (Ryen, 2002). We argue that our work process throughout the process 
have strengthened the research reliability. As mentioned, we have worked closely together 
and argued and agreed on every decision made. We have both been present at every interview 
and divided the roles between us. This has made it possible for us to check and control each 
other through the process, and reduce the chance for methodical errors. The fact that we have 
transcribed every interview has also been important for the reliability. Even though one of us 
always took notes during the interview, the transcription made after were vital. It enabled us 
to check what was actually being said and in what relation, which made our interpretations 
more accurate.  If the data from the interview only had been based on notes made during the 
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interview, the data could have been filtered, simply because you don’t manage to write down 
everything that’s being said (Ryen, 2002). Finally, the informants’ descriptions and 
experiences concerning France and Norway were very consistent and unambiguous. This 
unambiguousness enhances the study’s reliability.    
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4 Work Life 
The disposal of this study limits our capacity to paint the complete picture of Norwegian and 
French work life (if that’s even possible), but we want to aim this description on factors we 
believe have considerable influence on management style and trust relationships in 
Norwegian and French organizations. We argue that in the Norwegian work life the values 
equality and democracy are deeply rooted, while the work life in France is more characterized 
by elitism and class distinction.  
 
4.1 Norwegian Work Life 
Several international studies show the same; the Nordic countries are the countries with the 
highest level of trust in the world. Norway was ranked as the country with the highest level of 
interpersonal trust by the World Values Survey (2006). 74 per cent of the Norwegians 
answered “most people can be trusted” to the question “general speaking, would you say most 
people can be trusted or that you have to be careful in dealing with people” (World Values 
Survey, 2006). The European Research Society (den europeiske samfunnsundersøkelsen) 
compered the level of trust in several countries in 2002, 2008 and 2010 (ref. in Skirbekk, 
2012). The Nordic countries score the highest in all studies, both to trust to people in general 
and to institutions in society (Skirbekk, 2012). The high level of trust has existed a long time 
in Norway, and according to H. Skirbekk & G. Skirbekk (2012), it has emerged from 
centuries of peace, stability and a relatively faire legal system. Norway is characterized by 
several features that have proven to have a positive correlation to trust, in particular: low 
economic differences, cultural homogeneity, ethnic homogeneity, low degree of corruption, 
absent of a dominating aristocracy and relatively open and transparent decision- and work 
procedures from the government. The high level of trust has been argued as being one of 
Norway’s foremost competitive advantaged, and vital for the existence of the Model of 
Collaboration in Work Life (Samarbeidsmodellen), which is an important component in the 
Norwegian work life (Levin et al., 2012). 
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4.1.1 The Norwegian Model of Collaboration 
It is claimed that the Norwegian work life is one of the most democratic in the world, with 
characterizations as high degree of consensus, general high level of education, low levels of 
conflict and strong emphasize on equality (Arbeid og Sosialdepartementet, 2010). Employees’ 
rights to participate and co-determination are also emphasized. Focus is on both direct 
individual influence and representative systems, which are founded in agreements and laws in 
all levels of companies (Falkum et al., 2009). The institutional framework of the Model of 
Collaboration has been established throughout the twentieth century, and one important aspect 
of the model is the parties’ mutual recognition of rights and obligations. The Norwegian 
Model of Collaboration consists of three main actors: the manager, trade union representative 
and the employee. The Model of Collaboration concerns the relations between these at an 
organizational level, and takes place in three main forms: 
1. The representative co-determination from the trade union representative is fixed by 
law and agreements. 
2. Cooperation between the parties is characterized by wide co-determination and direct 
participation, meaning everyone is included in decision-making concerning their own 
work and can use their voice in proper place. 
3. Cooperation is expanded to concern conditions that are beyond the cooperation 
regulated by law and agreements (Levin et al., 2012, p. 28).  
The trade unions are a fundamental principle in Norway. The Norwegian work life is highly 
organized.  In 2001, 57 per cent of the workforce had membership in a trade union, and about 
70 per cent was covered by a tariff agreement (Engelstad et al., 2003, p. 218-221 ref. in 
Falkum et al., 2009). The relationship between managers and trade unions consist of mutual 
respect, accept and cooperation. As one informant stated “The Norwegian trade unions are 
more pragmatic. They understand that playing on the same team is important” (Informant no. 
4). The relationship has not always been like this. The establishment of the Basic Agreement 
(Hovedavtalen) in 1935 represents the entrance to a new era, where class struggle and mutual 
mistrust gradually were replaced by cooperation and mutual respect (Levin, 2012, p. 39). The 
positions and roles of the parties changed with the Basic Agreement; they now viewed the 
other party’s rights and roles as equally important. Today, tariff agreements are at the core of 
regulation of the different party’s relationship in the Norwegian work life. The agreements’ 
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key position emphasizes the trade unions’ position and power when it comes to the 
employees’ right to co- determination. In the European context, it’s a strong connection in the 
Nordic countries between trade unions and the employees’ influence and co-determination.  
The tariff agreements are unalterable, so the individual employer has no possibility to make 
an agreement outside the arrangement in the agreements (Engelstad et al., 2003).   
The Work Environment Act (Arbeidsmiljøloven) is the closes we come to a common law for 
the Norwegian work life. The Work Environment Act secures more clear and comprehensive 
rights to employees’ participation concerning their own work situation, than any other laws or 
agreements in other countries (Levin et al., 2012).  
 
As mentioned, The Work Environment, the Basic Agreement and the Model of Collaboration 
have resulted in a high level of influence for Norwegian employees. According to Levin et al. 
(2012), the literature distinguishes direct and indirect influence as influence you have of your 
own work space and influence you have on organizational level, as decision-making. They are 
hard to separate and both belong in organizational democracy, but they operate differently 
(Levin et al., 2012). The latter type of influence is established mainly by laws and through 
representatives, as a relationship between union representative and managers. The direct 
influence is more depending on the worker’s own actions. It describes rights and obligations, 
from both the employer and the employee (Arbeid og Sosialdepartementet, 2010). The 
management has to facilitate for employee involvement, but it also requires responsibility and 
understanding of the work process of the employee, in order to comprehend communication, 
cooperation and decision-making in the work performance. It further requires an employee’s 
engagement for learning and development (Levin et al., 2012). We argue that these mutual 
depending relations are vital for trust in the work space. The employees trust the management 
to facilitate channels of influence through involvement and communication. On the other 
hand, the management trusts the employee to gain knowledge and actively involve himself 
through the autonomous workplace. The employee is given a lot of influence through these 
establishments, which also requires trust between the parties. 
 
To summarize, the democratic systems and arrangements have a great support from both 
management and employees. These systems are not just accepted, they are established by 
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regulations and law modes of operation, which make them seen as a natural premise for the 
Norwegian work life structure. Co-determination, participation and democratic structure of 
organizations are institutionalized as an accepted model for thought, word and action in the 
Norwegian work life. This mutual understanding of reality from both managers and 
employees of how organizations should be structured and operate, forms a context for work 
life that is special and distinctively Norwegian (Falkum et al., 2009).   
 
4.1.2 The Norwegian Education System 
Another important factor that contributes to maintain the ideal of equality in society is the 
education system. The ideal of enhetsskolen is well embedded in Norwegian education 
system and society (OECD, 2013). The necessity of a Norwegian enhetsskole aroused in a 
time where Norway had recently gained national independence. It was a country with few 
large cities, scattered population, and a need to unify. In addition, Norway was an egalitarian 
society with strong democratic traditions and a “weak” upper class (Tønnesen, 2004, ref. in 
Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2006-2007). Enhetsskolen was supposed to be nationally unifying, 
socially equaling and socially reconciling, as well as to create the foundation for increasing 
political engagement and democratic participation (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2006-2007)
2
.  
The idea behind enhetsskolen is equality and availability to all (OECD, 2013). This is true for 
Norwegian higher education as well, which is why economic and judicial actions, as Statens 
Lånekasse, have been implemented in the education system (Mangset, 2004). Everyone is 
supposed to have the same opportunities to pursue an education and a job, no matter your 
socioeconomic background. As we see, equality is the main focus.  
The European Training Foundation (2008) has explored the transition process from education 
to work. They state;  
“The transition from education to work by young people is a complex process in 
which socioeconomic structures and institutional and policy settings in several areas 
interrelate. (…) [T]he outcomes of the transition process vary significantly between 
countries and national systems” (The ETF, 2008).  
                                                 
2
 Many debates have recently been raised concerning the actual success of enhetsskolen, but 
we do not find it relevant to further discuss it here. For more information: Hernes and 
Knudsen 1976, Bakken and Elstad 2012, both in OECD 2013. 
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Mangset (2004) identifies the Norwegian transition, and she states that the real career hunt 
starts after you get your first job. The education itself is no longer enough in Norway, you 
need voluntary experience, you should have international experience, and network is a huge 
benefit.  Other job experience is also quite advantageous, as the recruitment process is more 
characterized by standing out from the rest and differ from the formal equality (Mangset, 
2004). It is quite rare to go straight to a top job position right after ended studies (Mangset, 
2004).     
 
4.1.3 Cultural Dimensions 
Professor Geert Hofstede (The Hofstede Centre, 2014) conducted a comprehensive study of 
how values in workplace are influenced by national culture. His research has extended the 
understanding of cross-cultural management, theory and practice, revealing that members of 
different societies hold divergent values concerning the nature of organizational and the 
interpersonal relationship within them (Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina & Nicholson, 1997). Both 
Norway and France was a part of Hofstede’s research, and his findings on the different 
cultural dimension are useful for the understanding of society’s values and norms which 
affect the work life.  According to Hofstede (The Hofstede Centre, 2014), Norway is a 
country with low power distance and an individualistic, feminine society
3
.  
 
Power distance is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members of an institution 
or organization expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” (The Hofstede Centre, 
2014). This low power distance is described by one informant who states that Norwegian 
organizations are: “pretty open and democratic. It’s normally easy to contact your manager, 
discuss issues and together find a solution”(Informant no.3). Another informant describes the 
low hierarchies and how managers are concern with the employee’s co-determination, and 
how cooperation is a topic often talked about. Norway scores eight and is thus the second 
most feminine society (after Sweden). Feminine societies have more “soft” values, consensus, 
leveling others and sympathy for the underdog, rather than masculine societies that’s driven 
by values like competition, achievement and success (The Hofstede Centre, 2014). These 
                                                 
3 Hofstede later introduced other dimensions, see The Hofstede Center (2014).   
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feminine values representing Norway reinforce the democratic and equal assumption about 
Norwegian work life.  
 
4.2 The Norwegian Manager 
Our basis is that the work life, with the factors presented above, shapes the managers ground 
rules and influences their management style. The work life represents a framework that the 
manager must relate to. Norwegian managers must relate to the law- and system of 
agreements, norms and values in society that creates the context the organizations operate in. 
Grennes (2012) argues that if you want to understand what characterizes the “Norwegian 
management model”, a description of the Norwegian culture is necessary. Values and norms 
that differentiates a culture from another can also tell us a lot about which management 
qualities that are accepted and expected from the employees. As mentioned, the 
institutionalized systems and agreements of co-determination, participation and democratic 
structure of organizations have a strong influence on management and its control and practice 
(Falkum et al., 2009). “Management in Norwegian” is mainly about obtaining the support of 
their employees. The manager’s legitimacy is therefore directly linked to cooperation and the 
collective and individual influence of the employees. To a large extent, it’s about the 
managers taking advantage of the employee’s competence and capacity, which postulate 
dialog, reciprocal trust and an agreement on the use of the means (Falkum et al., 2009).   
 
As described above, the high degree of trust between the different parties in the Norwegian 
work life, distended through daily relations between the management, trade union 
representative and employee, creates a considerable framework for non- hierarchal 
organizations. The mutual trust can make detailed work specifications superfluous and direct 
control unnecessary. It also allows for the employees to participate in the development and 
efficiency improvements in the organization (Levin et al., 2012). The informants all had 
similar description about the typical Norwegian manger. “Open” (Informant no.3, no.4), 
“democratic” (Informant no.1, no.2, no.4, no.5, no.6) and ”low distance” (Informant no.2, 
no.3, no.4, no.5) were all features the informants highlighted in the interviews. These 
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descriptions correspond to the low power distance Hofstede’s research indicates. As one 
informant explained: 
 Norwegian managers are very including, there’s a pretty flat manager structure as I 
 sense it. They are pretty good at delegate – that is, they can work through their 
 coworkers. We are also concerned with things like work environment, good relations 
 and employees’ co-determination (Informant no.2). 
 
This description is similar to Hofstede’s description of Norwegian management. According to 
Hofstede (The Hofstede Centre, 2014), low score on the dimension power distance indicates a 
manager style characterized as a coaching manager, the managers facilitates and empower 
their employees, hierarchy for convenience only, access to superiors and equal rights. The 
employees also expect to be consulted (The Hofstede Centre, 2014). Katz (2007) has a similar 
description of the Norwegian manager and argues that the Norwegian managers are not 
necessarily considered superior. The managers are usually easily accessible and are expected 
to be a team member and manager at the same time. This is not a surprise, considering that 
“everyone” in the Norwegian work life is engaged in that rules and agreements are followed. 
Also, the system of cooperation, which the Model of Collaboration is based on, has a high 
degree of support and accept from all parties (Falkum et al., 2009). In addition, another 
informant described the Norwegian manager as pragmatic, that they are able to implement 
decisions relatively quick.  
As mentioned, the workforce in Norway is highly educated and the respect for the employees’ 
competence and knowledge is therefore large in Norway. According to a management study, 
state 80 per cent of the managers state that they have employees with higher competence than 
themselves (Strand, 2007, p. 503 ref. in Levin et al., 2012).  
 
4.3 The French Work Life 
We believe that Anderson (2009 ref. in Melle, 2012) has an accurate point with his statement 
“France is, of all European countries, the most difficult for any foreigner to write about” 
(Anderson, 2009, p. 137, ref. in Melle, 2012, p. 207). According to Barsoux & Lawrence 
(1991), France is both different and difficult for outsiders to apprehend. It’s a paradox of 
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equality and elitism, and of individualism and insecurity, it’s the best “society- mystery” in 
Europe. It is with these words in mind, we’ll present and describe the French work life.  
 
In contrast to Norway, France has been described as a low- trust society (Fukuyama, 1995). 
According to Fukuyama (1995), in France, it is a pronounced cultural distance for informal, 
face-to-face relationship and it is apparent in many aspects of economic life. In France, only 
19 per cent answered that “most people can be trusted” on the World Values Survey (2006).  
 
4.3.1 Employee Representation 
French law does not recognize any form of co-determination (Eurofound, 2009). It can 
therefore be argued that French labor law contributes to maintain the high power distance. 
France has a complex system of employee representation at workplace level, through both 
unions and structures elected directly by the workforce as a whole (worker- participation.eu, 
2013).  In the French system, employee representation in companies occurs at three levels; 
trade union level, work Council level and health and safety committee level.  
 
In membership terms, the French trade union is one of the weakest in Europe. Only eight per 
cent of the nation employees are members (worker- participation.eu 2013) and only five per 
cent in the private sector (Thompson, 1996). Historically, there have been five main rival 
union confederations, competing for membership. The main confederations are the CGT, 
CFDT, FO, CFTC and CFE-CGC, which primarily represent professionals and managerial 
employees. But despite their weakness in terms of membership, French trade unions have 
been able to mobilize their members for mass action and have a strong support in elections for 
employees’ representative (worker- participation.eu, 2013). The unions have been criticized 
for being unable to attempt new solutions and adapt to new situations; they are more 
concerned with defending their own interests than those of the workers as a whole (this is a 
real problem since only eight per cent of the French workers are members). The unions’ 
overreliance on strike and mass demonstration have also been criticized, implicating the trade 
unions difficulty in developing new, more efficient ways to participate in the dialogue 
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between the employer, employees and the state (Thompson, 1996). This criticism has been 
shared by some of our informants, one stating:  
My impression of the trade unions is that they are quite selfish, they only think of their 
own good. They have no problems with paralysing the whole country by going on 
strike. This goes for all the trade unions, and they use demonstrations and strike very 
often, and then on the expense of the whole country (Informant no.1). 
 
The other level of employee representations is the work council. But the consultation rights of 
the work council are limited. There is a general requirement that the managers should consult 
the work council in advance before a planned change with a significantly affect. The 
consultation does not mean that the work council has to agree before any planned changes are 
implemented; it is simply an opportunity for the work council views to be heard (worker- 
participation.eu 2013).  
French regulation and representation are described as special examples of unionization and 
agreement coverage (avtaledekning) in European context (Arbeid og Sosialdepartementet, 
2010). As mentioned, the membership in trade unions is very low, but the level of work 
conflict is very high. An individual right to strike without specific consultations might be the 
answer to this. The French systems are therefore in large contrast to the Norwegian, where 
there is an obligation of peace between the major negotiations (hovedforhandlingene) (Arbeid 
og Sosialdepartementet, 2010). Even though the percentage of membership in unions is very 
low, over 90 per cent of the French workforce is covered by generalized collective agreements 
(Arbeid og Sosialdepartementet, 2010), which contributes to the worker’s rights. But they are 
not grounded by law in the same way as participation in Norway, which could help explain 
the high level of conflict and low degree of trust.  
 
4.3.2 Cultural Dimensions 
Hofstede’s study indicates that French society is characterized by fairly high power distance 
(The Hofstede Centre, 2014). This is in accordance with our literature findings, and our 
informants’ descriptions, of a French elitist culture. The great hierarchy in French 
organization was also highlighted by our informants; one even pointed to the fact that the 
employees expected this practice. “If you work on the floor, you work on the floor. Nothing 
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more is expected” (Informant no.6). Hofstede argues that children in France are raised 
emotionally dependent, to a degree, on their parents, and that this dependency is transferred to 
teachers and later on to superiors. French society is therefore a society where a fair degree of 
inequality is accepted (The Hofstede Centre, 2014). The power distance is described by our 
informant: 
Many of the French managers keep a sever distance from the people working for them. 
They endure the hierarchies. They would only eat lunch with people at the same level 
as them or higher, and to be seen with one that works for you, is not a good thing for 
the manager (Informant no.4). 
 
The cultural dimension “uncertainty avoidance” concerns the fact that the future can never be 
known. While Norway scores 50, and therefore doesn’t indicate a preference on this 
dimension, France scores 86, which indicates high uncertainty avoidance. This suggest that 
the French feel threatened by unknown situations, which is illustrated with strong needs for 
laws, rules and regulations. They also have a need to possess all necessary information before 
a meeting or negotiations (The Hofestede Centre, 2014), an interesting aspect we will look 
closer at later in this study.   
France is a somewhat feminine culture, with a score at 43. France is relatively more 
masculine than Norway, but its famous welfare system (securité sociale), which includes 35 
hours working week, focus on quality of life and five weeks holidays, indicate feminine 
characteristics. With a score of 71, is France characterized as an individualistic society.  
 
4.3.3 Education System 
The French education system is, not surprisingly, mirrored in features of French society and 
history (F. Orivel & E. Orivel 1998). F. Orivel & E. Orivel (1998) define the system as 
centralized, state-orientated and unified, as well as free and egalitarian. They highlight that 
even though it is egalitarian, it is not necessarily equitable. It is more an egalitarian tradition, 
which resulted from the French Revolution (F. Orivel & E. Orivel 1998). The Revolution 
succeeded in entitling the same rights for all students, regardless of socioeconomic 
background. This form for equality is more formal, as those who face specific obstacles do 
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not deserve specific or adjusted treatments. This has led to debate concerning the actual 
functioning of the system, as students from high economic backgrounds tend to monopolize 
the best tracks in the education system (F. Orivel & E. Orivel 1998). According to Mangset 
(2004), Bourdieu has a possible explanation to this. He believes that the school system values 
knowledge, language and the cultural capital of so-called elite kids, making them more 
successful in school.  
Intellect is characterized as high-premium feature of the French society, which also infiltrates 
the education system. An example is how management studies just recently gained status in 
France, as it traditionally was associated with business and wealth, not intelligence. The 
education’s roles are limited to transmit knowledge and train the intellect, not to develop the 
full individual (Barsoux & Lawrence, 1991). The curriculum also bears traces of this, with its 
emphasis on logic, mathematics and Cartesianism. It could be discussed whether this 
emphasis on pure knowledge, prior to know-how, is profitable in a managerial context.  
 
As mentioned, French society is characterized by a unitary elite. According to Barsoux & 
Lawrence (1991), what both unify and justify the elite are the common educational 
experiences at Grandes Ecoles. The students have been shaped by the predominant values and 
by the competition to gain admission to them. Most executive positions in France are filled 
with graduates from Grandes Ecoles or universities. One informant said he knew companies 
that would only hire people from the top five schools. Another informant said; “It’s an elitist 
culture. The management team at top level all comes from the same school. They have close 
relations, while it’s a wide distance between managers and the employees” (Informant no.2). 
It can even be claimed that the managerial elite in France is selected by the age of fifteen. 
Certain students are enabled to attend prestigious schools, which gives access to brilliant 
careers, through a selective process (Derr, Roussillon & Bournois, 2002). One of our 
informants, who has been a student in the French education, describes his experience: 
The French school system wants to create winners, selfish winners. The school system 
doesn’t emphasize working in teams, and doesn’t have a focus on “making others 
better”. This pervades the whole system. The new qualified always aim to show that 
they are better than others (Informant no.6). 
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The French work hierarchy does not work in the sense that new employees should begin at the 
bottom. The long tradition of elites and status in the education system has outbalanced it, and 
it is common to fit right into a manager position (Mangset, 2004, F. Orivel & E. Orivel, 
1998). The Grandes Ecoles seem to contribute too, and emphasize, the high power distance in 
France. One informant stated that people from Grandes Ecoles expected – even demanded - to 
be treated differently because of the hierarchy in the school system. Another described how 
the school contributed to the creation of an elitist society; “you will get paid by what school 
you come from. Even though you do the same job, a person from the Grandes Ecoles can 
demand a higher salary than others”  (Informant no.1).   
 
4.4 The French Manager   
As for Norway, also French managers are shaped and adjusted by the context described 
above. The long-standing traditions of elitism and class distinction, introduced early in the 
French school system, seem to endure throughout education and recruitment process, into 
organizations. We argue that the aspects that have used to describe French work life, such as 
elitism and power distance, in addition to complicated understanding of trade unions, are all 
reasons that could help explain the low levels of trust. It will also give implications of how a 
manager should behave. An informant states; “Firstly, there’s much more hierarchy [in 
France]. It naturally affects a manager in that way that managers are expected to be skilled 
and know more than his subordinates”(Informant no.3).  He goes on, saying that there are 
expectations in the organizations that managers function as elites, and that there is big 
distance between managers and subordinates. They all usually come from Grandes Ecoles, as 
both literature (Barsoux & Lawrence, 1991) and our informants emphasize. The values at 
these Grandes Ecoles, such as networking, intelligence and Cartesianism help promote a 
management style that is described. 
 
The term cadre is one that has no equivalent in other languages. Basically, it corresponds to 
“managers” in English, though with rather different legal and sociological connotations.  Just 
as managers must manage, so the cadre is there to encadrer. The fact that the French term 
was borrowed from the military circles is not without significance (Barsoux & Lawrence, 
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1991). When we interviewed our informants, they emphasized the strong hierarchies and how 
that was reflected in the management style of French managers. From an institutional 
perspective, this management style comes natural considering the description above. The 
educational system maintains and reinforces the high power distance described by Hofstede. 
In France, superiors behave as superior beings, and subordinates accept and expect this, 
conscious about their own lower level in the national hierarchy but also of the honor of their 
class (Hofstede, 1993, p. 84). According to Hofstede (1993), the French doesn’t think in terms 
of managers versus non-managers but in terms of cadres versus non- cadres: one becomes a 
cadre by attending the right school and one remains as such forever.  
 
4.5 Summary and Assumptions  
The descriptions of French and Norwegian societies portray two work lives with wide 
differences, concerning cultural values, labor legislation and educational system. We have 
argued that these factors together affect the style of managers. These descriptions of the 
French and Norwegian work life and management style constitute our basis for the further 
analysis. We want to conclude with a presentation of the most important characteristic of 
Norway and France:  
 Norway France 
Interpersonal trust 
level in society 
High Low 
Labor law Individual rights and employee 
representation 
Employee representation 
Trade unions Characterized by mutual 
understanding, respect and 
cooperation 
Low union membership, 
overreliance on strike, opposition  
Co-determination 
by law 
Yes No 
36 
 
Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions 
Low power distance, neutral 
relationship to uncertainty, 
individualistic, feminine 
High power distance, high 
uncertainty avoidance, 
individualistic, feminine 
Education focus Equality Elitist 
Society Egalitarian Elitist 
Management style Democratic, open, involving Cadre, power distance, “Superior 
skills” 
         4.1 Summarizing table 
 
This table is based on both literature and our informants’ descriptions. The most obvious 
differences would be the dimensions that are grounded in law, such as co-determination and 
labor law. Even though we argue that they are all vital in defining work life in France and 
Norway, some of them will be more emphasized in the study.  
In the next chapter, we will use these descriptions of the French and Norwegian work life and 
management style to further analyze trust relations in organizations. In order to find out how 
management style affects trust, we will examine decision-making processes in both Norway 
and France, as we argue that it is in these situations both the style of the manager and its 
effect on trust relations will be highly visible.  
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5 Decision-making Process 
Through last chapter, we were able to elaborate on the management styles in France and 
Norway. As our descriptions illustrate, the management styles differ, almost close to the 
opposite. This is especially true in the employee - manager relation. We have already assumed 
that these distinct differences in management style, embedded in quite different surroundings, 
leads to different types of trust relations. As we assumed, the trust relations and management 
style will be highly evident in a decision making process. We want to examine how decision 
making processes unfold and, maybe more importantly, who’s included and excluded in the 
process at the different stages. Fredrickson (1986) suggests that organizational structures have 
great implication for decision-making. Internal patterns of relationships, how authority is 
distributed and how communication takes place, are factors that constitute an organization’s 
structure, which again is vital for how decisions-making unfold. As our previous chapters 
have revealed, patterns of relationships, types of trust and authority greatly differ between 
Norway and France. We expect that the differences in level of trust in Norway and France 
will be reflected in decision-making processes.  
 
Even though none of the informants have worked together in the same companies, they still 
shared a resembling view of the different processes, both in France and in Norway. The 
descriptions were mainly concerned with who’s involved, in addition to the actual process. A 
decision making process consist of several steps, from an issue is on the agenda to its 
solutions are implemented. Based on our interviews, we want to highlight how things get on 
the agenda, the preparatory work (emphasizing how and who’s included) and how the 
decision is actually made. In the conclusion of this chapter, we will use Lewicki and Bunker’s 
(1996) model of trust to present some further more specific assumptions about trust relations 
in Norway and France. We expect Erez (1993) to be right in that societal and cultural values 
will be visible in decision-making processes. The assumption will lay the basis for discussions 
and analysis to come. 
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5.1 How to Influence the Agenda 
Norwegian employees have several formal channels secured by the law- and system of 
agreements to help them get their issues on the current agenda. Both the concept of direct 
participation and representative systems are channels that secure the employees’ involvement 
in decision-making and everyday organizational life. These formal channels have support 
from all the parties in the Model of Collaboration (Levin et al., 2012). The high level of 
involvement is also confirmed by our informants, as we have shown in chapter four, they 
have describe the Norwegian managers as “open”, “democratic” and ”low distance”.  The low 
power distance from Hofstede’s research also explains the employees’ access to influence the 
agenda setting. As in Norway, the representative systems in France are supposed to be a way 
for the employees to get issues on the agenda for decision-making. But when the informants 
described the agenda setting in French organization, they stressed the importance of informal 
networks. The informal networks seem to work as an alternative entrance to get their issues 
on the agenda. Considering the low support French trade unions have, and their difficulties to 
cooperate with the managers, it may be rational to seek other entrances. As one informant 
stated: 
If you got a “no” on an issue, it was a severe lobbyism to get the issue back on the 
agenda- you had to push the right buttons, talk to the right people and spend time on 
this. It was one time we had a case that they said no to, but after a year we got a yes. I 
learned the importance of talking to people and just meet them regularly even though 
you didn’t have anything specific to talk to them about. It was just to keep the contact. 
That was extremely important. In Norway you just eat with the same people every day 
(Informant no. 4). 
 
Another informant had a similar description about how he made sure to keep in contact with 
certain people just to keep those connections warm. As the single employees have difficulties 
in getting their issue on the agenda through the formal channel, informal networks can be 
used as a backdoor. Another informant highlighted that the informal networks is often created 
between people with the same background. Grandes Ecoles is often what they have in 
common. Like our informant stated:  
…a lot of [the managers] come from the same environment, have gone to the same 
school and share similar backgrounds. They say “tu” instead of “vous” to each other, 
and they trust each other based on their mutual background. I don’t know how to 
explain it, but the trust is more predetermined (Informant no. 2).   
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The fact that trust seems predetermine is interesting. According to theory, trust may be built 
on resembles. These resembles can be for instance be same social background, education, 
experiences and so on (Ekman, 2004). Ekman (2004) argues that “hidden action”, which in 
our case is informal networking, happens when there’s low trust between manager and 
employee. This hidden action happens without the manager knowing. The importance of 
lobbyism in French organization can therefore indicate low level of trust in the organization, 
especially in the employer- employee relation. In the same way, with more extensive 
resemblance and equality, the same argument may also indicate a higher level of trust in 
employer- employee relations in Norwegian organizations. We do not state that informal 
networking doesn’t occur in Norway, but the extent and influence of the informal networks 
seem to be more important in France. The Model of Collaboration secures a high level of 
involvement, which makes the informal networks as a way to put issues on the agenda 
superfluous.  
The Grandes Ecoles were certainly a recurring topic which all of our informants had 
experience with. “People expect to be treated by school systems and hierarchy. They can 
demand a different treatment. The school system likes to create winners. Selfish winners. 
There is not much “play each other good” (Informant no.6).  
 
5.2 The Process 
Katz (2007) recognizes Norwegian decision-making style as a group process where consensus 
is established, and where all members get to voice their opinion. Participation in decision-
making processes is regulated by procedures that build on the fundamental values of 
democracy; equality and freedom (Hagen & Trygstad, 2007). There is a mutual understanding 
from all the parties in the Model of Collaboration that employees’ participation in decision 
making is a natural part of the process. Direct participation, altered in the Work Environment 
Act, ensures the employees’ rights to influence their own work situation. When asked to 
consider the level of this form of influence, the Norwegian workforce scores 4,4 on a scale 
from 1-5, which is a high score (Falkum et al., 2009).   
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One informant described the Norwegian decision-making process:   
(…) In Norway, you have a process that starts from the bottom where you discuss, 
then you work your way up in the hierarchy and share some information along the 
way, so when you come to the top and the CEO, he knows the case well, he trusts that 
there has been quality assurance all the way among the different disciplines on 
different levels. Where findings and defects have been closed. It will be so much easier 
to make a decision, he trusts that the system functions (Informant no.5).  
Another informant states:   
Norway is probably more democratic [than France], more straight to the point, we 
run straight further after something is decided. In France, top managers make a 
decision. Not a lot discussion concerning it, you just follow the manager. In Norway, 
there’s more discussion in the process itself (Informant no. 4).  
 
It seems like the managers in Norway have trust in their employees’ work. This is an 
important aspect of the systems of employee participation. The trust is duplex: As the 
employees are enjoying a high level of participation, the managers trust the employees to do 
their best, to constantly gain knowledge about the organization and purposes. He needs to be 
sure that they are on the same page and working towards the same goals - he needs to trust 
them. At the same level, the employees trust the managers to facilitate channels of 
involvement. According to Falkum & Bygdås (2012), Norwegian managers share their 
portion of decision power with employees to a greater extent than any other country. It 
regulates the relationship between employee and manager, where the needs of accept and trust 
is mutual depending (Falkum & Bygdås, 2012). As we can imagine, an authoritarian or 
paternalistic management style would be a bad fit in the Norwegian decision-making style. 
 
It also seems like the employees in Norwegian organization are able to discuss and challenge 
their bosses. Norwegian managers are described to be more fearless than the French:  
“Norwegians [employees] can challenge their bosses, and it’s not always the case that the 
boss is right” (Informant no.1). This is a reminder of the flatter structure the Norwegian 
employees enjoy. The distance between manager and employee is shorter. Another informant 
mentions the high level of education in Norway is important. He believes that Norwegian 
managers tend to look at their subordinates as “knowledge associates” 
(kunnskapsmedarbeidere) (Informant, no. 2) rather than actually subordinates. That would 
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also be a valid explanation as to why level of employee participation in decision-making is so 
high. Their presence and skills are actually wanted, not only required by law. Also Grenness 
(2012) states that Norwegian managers have as much faith in their subordinates as in their 
colleagues when it comes to decision-making. As the informants explain, discussions 
concerning both the process and the actual last decision is more likely to be questioned by 
lower levels of managers in Norway than in France. Norwegians might consider discussions 
at lower levels in the organization more fruitful, and thus more important than French. Several 
minds think better than one. The system of Grandes Ecoles, hierarchy, networking and status 
in France seems to give a mode of operation that contradicts this view.  
(…) there was always high degree of loyalty to the final decision [in France]. I’ve 
seen a lot more tendencies to rematches here in Norway. It’s very open, you raise your 
hand and ask a question. This leads to more discussion rounds. Not like that in 
France” (Informant no. 2). 
   
It seems like in France, only the top managers get to raise questions.  
As our informants describe, the decisions in French organizations are, in contrast to 
Norwegian, often taken at the top of the hierarchy. It seems quite centralized. Schramm-
Nielsen (2001) explains how French middle managers are responsible for locating all possible 
alternatives in a decision-making process, before top managers later select one of them. One 
of our informants described how he wasn’t involved or got no information of the process: 
 
 I laid the groundwork, it got sent right into a mill, and I wasn’t informed…well I 
wasn’t involved in anything. I see in my organization in Norway today, we include the 
new and young ones a lot more. (…) They were happy with you [in France] as long as 
you delivered precise work. (…) I got a lot from above. It was obviously a system with 
a lot of bureaucracy and reporting that existed above me (Informant no. 3).  
 
One informant highlights that decision-making in France and Norway also has some similar 
features, for example the system in itself. The process from intention to result, or as 
Schramm-Nielsen (2001) says, from a perception of problem to actions to solve it, lingers in 
terms of quality assurance and delegation of tasks. But according to the same informant, 
French employees hold an insecurity, which has a major impact on the process: 
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“In France, it’s the same system, they run the same quality assurance that they are 
supposed to. But the workers get unsecure, trying to guess what the boss wants, it 
leads to no cooperation, it’s more a battle over who knows the most. It creates the 
weirdest requirements to do the job over again, which makes it tough down the 
hierarchy. There is no trust between the different subsections. There are a lot of arms 
and legs in the final phase. (…) when you think you have done your part, and then 
actually everything starts”(Informant no. 2).   
 
As mentioned, French middle managers present their results to the superiors, who make the 
final decision (Schramm-Nielsen, 2001). A special feature of the hierarchical relations in 
French organizations is that middle managers are completely depending on their manager for 
recognition and promotion. It means that the subordinates would want to make a spotless 
impression and not make any mistakes. This includes having considered every possible 
alternative in a decision-making process. This is consistent with what our informants have 
expressed, describing a fear culture where you perform your outmost to not make any 
mistakes. One informant said that if he made one mistake, he felt like he had to do the next 4 
tasks absolutely perfect in order to make up for the one mistake made. Another informant said 
that his fellow colleagues seem to have an absolute fear for both making mistakes and their 
bosses.  
 
One informant stated: “The French system is like this because of great differences between 
classes in society. We’re better at taking care of each other in Norway”(Informant no. 3). He 
continues to describe France as quite elitist, where the old tradition of class separation still is 
functioning. Authority in organizations seems to be accepted somehow, and as many 
informants stated, managers enjoy a great deal of respect. It seems like a part of it can be 
explained by societal norms, as acceptance of authority, which again leads to more passive 
employees and strict management.  
 
Several informants describe the French decision-making process as quite detailed with a lot of 
reporting and bureaucracy. “Everything I did had to be right. It couldn’t even be a misplaced 
comma. Everything I wrote, every report, account and so on had to be brilliant. I spent so 
much time on these things because I knew how important it was” (Informant no. 4). 
43 
 
One of our informants believes it’s because the top managers want full control, as every 
decision can be traced back to names. The fear of making mistakes or lose face becomes 
evident again. Schramm-Nielsen (2001) supports this, saying that French managers have an 
extremely tight control, which will compensate for possible lack of commitment to a decision. 
Another informant stated:  
I think it’s traced back to a fear for the bosses; you don’t try to challenge them. Some 
of the bosses, especially at the headquarter, have an attitude like “we’re God, we 
know better than everyone else”. (…) The communication is very top down. (…) In 
Norway, you are free to say whatever you want, they are more careful here. At the 
same time, it’s very tedious. When you’re doing stuff, you discuss a lot, it takes a lot of 
time to make a precise decision. A lot of analysis (Informant no. 1). 
 
In a French decision-making process, after a superior has made the final decision, lower level 
subordinates are the ones to implement it. Schramm-Nielsen (2001) argues that the different 
phases described, where middle managers lay the groundwork, top managers making a 
decision, and lower level subordinates implementing it, seems to work in a French context 
where superiors are the ones who have the most information.  
A fear for the bosses, as mentioned, recurs in the interviews. Several informants explain how 
discussions, questioning or opposing the managers is none-existing in French organizations. 
“If a person doesn’t agree with [the top manager making a decision], he would be really 
tough if he said anything” (Informant no. 4). 
 
A French manager seems to always be right, and subordinates have no place in suggesting 
otherwise. He is expected to be clever, and know more than his employees, especially if he is 
from a Grandes Ecoles. The status they obtain is unlike anything in Norway. One of our 
informants confidently stated that he knew several managers in his department that shouldn’t 
be managers. They were simply just there still because they were protected by their status and 
network. This indicates a strong hierarchy, quite top-down, where channels of influence are 
one-way. This is opposed to the mentioned flatter structures in Norway, which also becomes 
evident in decision-making, as everyone is included. Lower level managers in Norway are 
also allowed to a large extent to make decisions without requiring further approval from 
managers higher in the chain (Katz, 2007).   
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5.3 Rationality and Decision-making 
According to March (1994), full rationality is the type of rationality that is most used in 
describing decision-making. The idea requires knowledge of all possible alternatives and full 
information. It is usually used to describe actions that have desirable outcomes. This all seems 
to be consistent with a French decision-making style. One informant said: “You are afraid of 
making a decision that turns out to be wrong. You spend so much time collecting all sort of 
information (Informant no. 1)”. Schramm-Nielsen (2001) describes French decision-making 
process as characterized by how middle managers will try to find all possible solutions or 
alternatives to evaluate. One informant stated that it’s “very French” (Informant no. 3) that 
everything should be perfect, while another informant emphasized that the Frenchmen are 
always concerned about what the truth is.  
 
As March (1994) implies, it is impossible to act with full rationality, both in theory and 
practice, as humans are limited by cognition. In addition, we cannot predict the future and 
know for sure if the alternative we choose is actually the “best” one. Still, the French seem to 
strive for a maximizing decision-making process, using a lot of resources on reports and 
controlling. The French managers aim to avoid uncertainty as much as they can. In Hofstede’s 
dimension of uncertainty avoidance, France scores 86, which implies that the French do not 
like risks. Rather, they seem to prefer complete knowledge of everything. These obsessions of 
always have complete and correct information before you make a decision, in addition to low 
risk-taking indicate low trust in the process of decision making. If everything is completely 
rational and calculated, the need for trust is less vital. When you take on a risk, the level of 
trust grows with it, with the opposite also being true. You don’t have to trust people around 
you if everything is known and certain, or if the degree of control is maximized in one way or 
another. As one informant puts it “For me, control is a sign of lower level of trust. If they 
don’t see you at work, they will have a hard time thinking you sit home and work”(Informant 
no. 2). According to these informants, decision-making in France functions because of their 
structure, hierarchy and the informal networks. They function as a substitute to a lack of trust 
and openness. Many things are solved “off the record”, by the coffee bar or in the hallway.  
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We do not argue that “it’s zero trust in the decision making process in France” (Informant no. 
5) as one of our informants did, but the structure of the process, the limited access to 
participate in the decision making and the need for all the information at hand before a 
decision is made all indicate a process based on low level of trust. Bachmann (2003) states 
that if you have all information at hand, trust becomes superfluous. This is consistent with the 
descriptions of French organizations as information seeking and with low trust.  
In contrast, Norwegian decision-making style seems to be accepting a limited rationality. 
They choose an alternative that is satisfying enough, an alternative that exceeds certain 
criteria or targets. It doesn’t mean that they are not as thorough as the French, but they do not 
necessarily have to locate every alternative. Norway scores 50 on Hofstede’s uncertainty 
avoidance dimension, which indicates that Norwegians do allow some risk (The Hofstede 
Centre, 2014). Also Katz (2007) recognizes Norwegians as moderate risk-takers. All of this 
indicates a higher level of trust in Norwegian decision-making process compared to France. 
The decision-makers trust their subordinates to have done a good job, and rely on their skills, 
which is why they are included in a much higher degree than French subordinates. This also 
eases the process, as the managers don’t have to start all over again when the process is 
supposed to be done. It could explain why our informants called Norwegian decision-making 
as more pragmatic, as they start to implement right away after a decision is made.  
 
March (1994) presents some modifications concerning risk and assumptions of rational 
choice. One of them is addressing the issue of knowledge – “what is assumed about the 
information decision makers have about the state of world and about other actors?” (March, 
1994, p.7). Concerning France, it is tempting to state that the decision-makers, the top 
managers, have a negative view about their subordinates. They are not involved, only the 
people on top should make decisions, as the subordinates do not share the same level of 
intelligence as them. March (1994) also describes how roles in hierarchies develop. He says 
that top-level executives tend to internalize the role as the decision-maker, as he is often doing 
it. In the end, there’s no question concerning who is in charge of the final decision. 
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5.4 Summary 
As mentioned, the trust relations and management style in organizations are at its most 
evident in decision-making processes. As a conclusion, it seems the decision making process 
in France is characterized by low level of trust, while the Norwegian decision process is 
characterized by a high level of trust. The trust level in the decision making process is visible 
in both the manager- employee relation and employer- employer relation. We have portrayed 
and discussed the different statements our informants have made concerning these processes. 
Our main findings are summarized in a table: 
 
 Norway France 
Decision-making style Pragmatic, open, including Closed, top managers 
make final decisions, want 
a lot of information 
Employee 
participation 
Grounded by law Limited 
Entrance to decision-
making  
Formal channels Informal networks 
Risk avoidance Medium High 
Rationality Limited rationality Full rationality 
        5.1 Summarizing table 
5.5 A Model of Trust 
Trust is described in many types and forms in the literature. We wish to elaborate on this 
chapter’s conclusion to get a more accurate understanding of the trust relations in France and 
Norway. To obtain this knowledge, we want to examine the level of trust and type of trust the 
relations in France and Norway are characterized of. We have therefore created a model 
where we have integrated the distinction between personal and impersonal trust together with 
the three- level trust model presented by Lewicki & Bunker (1996). Our assumptions about 
the correlations between level and form of trust in our model are based on the theoretical 
literature from the field and the descriptions from our informants.  
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The relations between personal trust and impersonal trust may be seen as continuum where 
they hold the opposite ends. We recognize that actual trust relations never will be at one end 
of the continuum, actors will always be somewhere in between. Still we argue that some trust 
relations will be dominated by personal trust while other trust relations of impersonal trust.  
This trust model illustrates our assumptions of how different levels of trust correlates with the 
form of trust, and the other way around. Example, in an organization where the trust relations 
are said to be at level three, identification-based trust, we assume that the trust relations in the 
organization will mainly take form of personal trust. In organizations where the trust relations 
are impersonal, we assume that the organization is at level one, which is calculus-based trust. 
At the second level of Lewicki & Bunker’s (1996) trust model, we assume that both forms for 
trust are likely to occur. Some organizations may be at level two, with trust relations 
characterized by an impersonal form for trust, while other organization may have a clear trace 
of personal form for trust. Which form for trust that is apparent at this level, can be less 
evident compared to the other two levels. In Lewicki & Bunker’s (1996) model, the time 
aspect is relevant for trust to develop to a higher level. As mentioned, we don’t emphasize the 
time aspect in our study. We want to examine certain conditions that influence both form and 
level of trust. We assume that both management style and institutional environment will be 
decisive in shaping these conditions. 
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5.6 Assumptions 
One of our assumptions is that trust relations in French organizations will be based on 
impersonal trust. In organizational context where highly generalized and powerful rules exist, 
individuals will find it more easy do develop this form of trust. Impersonal trust may, as we 
will elaborate on in a subsequent chapter, take form as system and institutionalized trust 
(Bachmann, 2003). For the same reason, we assume that trust relations in Norwegian 
organization will be based on personal trust. 
We present our assumptions that we will base our further analysis on: 
 The trust-relations in French organizations are at level one; calculus-based trust 
 The trust relations in Norwegian organizations are at level two and three; knowledge - 
and identification- based trust 
 Calculus- based trust will mainly take form as impersonal trust 
 Knowledge- based trust will, to a certain degree, take form as personal trust, while 
 Identification- based trust will mainly take form as personal trust 
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6 How Management Affect Trust 
In the last chapter we made specific assumptions concerning the level of trust in French and 
Norwegian organizations. We believe management can be used to explain the differences in 
trust, both between managers and employees and between employees. The way management 
is exercised can have a significant impact on the development of trust in the organizations 
(Hartog, 2003). Sørhaug (1996) describes transactional and transformational as typologies for 
social logics and argues that these logics denotes the managers’ manner of operation. In 
practice, manner of operation will always involve both forms, but which of the logics that 
dominates will vary. The transactional manager operates within established rules and 
frameworks, while the transformational manager changes these frameworks that these 
exchanges take place within. Transformational management is more than to exercise an “old 
work horse” that is shaped on a hierarchical organization. It’s about managing through or be 
influential through values, and have strong focus on handling relations. Transactional 
management can be argued to exist of elements of Weber’s goal oriented rationality, while the 
transformational management logic is similar to Weber’s value rationality. With the former, it 
is always possible in some way to calculate what behavior is the most beneficial, while value 
rationality is about what kind of goals you want, which are always substantial evaluations 
(Sørhaug, 2004).  
 
In the literature, the transformational management is often contrasted to transactional 
management. As we have examined in the last two chapters, the French and Norwegian 
management style differs significantly. We argue that the French managers have a logic 
dominated by transactional management, while Norwegian managers’ logic is dominated by 
transformational management. We argue that the transactional manager will contribute to 
calculus-based trust, and limit trust relations in French organization to develop further to the 
next levels of trust. The transactional management will also contribute to a larger extent of 
impersonal trust rather than personal trust in French organizations. The transformational 
manager on the other hand, will promote trust relations at knowledge-based level, and in some 
cases at the identification-based level. We also argue that trust in Norwegian organizations 
will be more of a personal form for trust. We also want to examine how trust relations 
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between manager- employee affects trust relations between employees under these logics of 
management.  
 
6.1 Transactional Management 
Bass (1990) defines transactional management as mainly an exchange or transaction, where 
the manager either rewards or punishes his employees, depending on their performance. The 
fundamental idea in an exchange model is that participants enter voluntarily in the exchange 
relationship, which is regulated by systems of rules (March, 1994). As Sørhaug (2004) 
describes it, transactional management takes place within a horizon or a given language of 
rules, preferences and values. Each participant brings resources into the relationship. These 
resources includes things as money, property, competence, knowledge, information and 
access to others (March, 1994). As described, the French managers demand precise and 
accurate work from their employees. It’s not much room in the terms of trade to make 
mistakes in this relationship, as we have described in the previous chapter. The French 
employees devote their time and competence to the manager, in return for recognition and 
promotion. In the transactional management both parties have something to gain and 
something to loose, which we will elaborate on in this chapter 
6.1.1 Control and Trust 
One aspect of trust that has been frequently discussed in the literature is the relationship 
between trust and control (Sørhaug, 1996, Backmann, 2003). There are two opposing 
perspective on this relationship; trust and control as complements, or substitutes: 
1. In the complement view, control and trust may coexist. One may trust each other because 
of the existing control mechanisms in the organization.  
2.  In the substitute view, the presence of control is said to cease the need for trust as the 
control render the present of the risk to minimal. Another argument is that you can’t say 
you trust another when you impose control as well (Dietz, Giellespie & Chao, 2010).  
The strong hierarchies and formal regulations in French organizations sustain and specify the 
control mechanisms transactional management takes place in. The hierarchies and formal 
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regulations lay the ground rules for the transactions and clarify the expectations, sanctions and 
rewards in the transactional relationship between the manager and employee. In transactional 
management the control is present, but it’s interesting to examine if it will work as 
complement or as substitute for trust in French organization. The complement view is similar 
to Russel Hardin’s view of trust (Hardin, 1996, ref. in Wright, 2009). According to Hardin, if 
people are trustworthy, they will do what other actors want them to do. Hardin believes that 
trustworthiness can be increased by social contracts and sanctions because he aligns being 
trustworthy with doing what the trustor wants. Since contracts and regulations make it more 
likely that the trustee will behave as the trustor wants, trustworthiness is increased by these 
means (Hardin, 1996, ref. in Wright 2009). Hardin’s view simplifies trustworthiness to the 
point that trustworthiness is simply compliance. Fukuyama (1995) also argues that hierarchies 
are necessary because not all people within a community can be relied upon to live by tacit 
ethical rules alone. A small number of people may search for ways to undermine or exploit 
others in the organization. Fukuyama (1995) points to the fact that some people tend to be 
free riders, willing to benefit from membership in the group while contributing as little as 
possible to the common cause. Hierarchy is necessary because you can’t expect everybody to 
do their fair share. Our informants on the other hand, seem to think that these control systems 
exist because of the lack and even non- existing trust in French organizations. As one 
informant said “Things work in this organization without trust because of the structures, 
hierarchies and the informal networks”(Informant no. 5). The substitute view was also 
supported by another informant who stated that the control systems in France indicted 
absence of trust.  
 
We agree with the complement view and argue that the control mechanism in French 
organizations creates the framework the transactional management takes place within. It does 
not indicate absent of trust, but instead a simple form for trust, namely calculus-based trust. In 
calculus-based trust, behavior control is a central aspect (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996, p.120).  In 
transactional relationship, the employees calculate if their actions are worth the rewards or 
sanctions that their actions may result in. If the benefits of their behavior are higher than the 
effort, it will be a rational behavior to act in accordance with the transactional relationship. 
The calculus-based trust relations could therefore be said to be goal oriented rational, in the 
way the employees calculate which behavior is the most beneficial. These control 
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mechanisms for behavior are made to ensure that the employees do what the manager wants, 
which is to be trustworthy by compliance.   
 
6.1.2 Deterrence and Trust 
The contract and regulations that support the transactional management must be designed to 
make it more desirable to fulfill the exchange, rather than to be a free rider and deal with the 
possible sanctions. The transactional relationship will create a basis for trust relationship at 
the lowest level of our trust model, which is calculus-based trust. Lewicki & Bunker's (1996) 
calculus-based trust builds on Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin (1992. ref. in Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1996) deterrence-based trust. The deterrence-based trust is grounded in the fear of 
punishment for violating the trust and in the rewards of preserving the trust. It is based on a 
calculation of the effort and cost to sustain the transactional relationship compared to the 
outcomes of the relationship (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996, p.119). Our statements from our 
informants describe trust characterized by deterrence- based trust in French organizations. As 
mentioned, it seems like there is a sort of fear culture in French organizations at the lower and 
middle levels in the organization. People are afraid of doing mistakes because there’s not 
much room for the employees to make mistakes, “If you do one mistake, you have to get it 
right four times before the one mistake is forgotten” (Informant no. 4). In this exchange 
relationship, if the employees’ performances don’t meet the expectations of the managers, a 
consequence is doubt and mistrust. As the informant described, trust in the French 
organizations must be created, and it must be recreated all the time. One informant said that 
he always spent so much time on writing every report correct, because he knew the 
consequences if he didn’t:   
It’s an enormous focus on quality in French organizations (…) It is high demands for 
quality in everything you do, and if you deliver something where the quality isn’t 
optimal, they would start question if you have control over your work. If you don’t 
have control over something simple as spelling correct, then they would start 
questioning the content too (Informant no. 4). 
 
The employees know that if a mistake is done, it will affect your position and relation to your 
manager. A suitable description was made from one informant on how “Trust in French 
organizations is performance oriented and knowledge oriented” (Informant no. 2).  
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6.1.3 Reputation and Trust 
The difference between Lewicki &Bunker's calculus-based trust and Shapiro, Sheppard and 
Cheraskin’s deterrence-based trust is that the former is often ensured by “reward” of being 
trustworthy and the “threat” that if the trust is violated, one’s reputation can be hurt (Lewicki 
& Bunker, 1996, p.120). Calculus-based trust includes the aspect of reputation. If A violates 
the trust of B, B can quickly let it be known in the formal and informal network that A can be 
seen as an untrustworthy person. In business relations, a professional reputation of the other 
actor can be served as a “hostage” (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996, p. 120). One informant 
describes how you are in trouble if you get a bad reputation and how easily people talk behind 
each other’s back: 
 
The French people are horrible at talking behind other peoples back. If you get a bad 
reputation in, say a meeting, then you are on deep water. That is really serious. And 
you have to work hard to get your head over water again, and clear your name 
(Informant no. 4).  
 
Another informant describes how one mistake can affect your reputation: 
I felt that many people were afraid. They were afraid of doing mistakes and get a bad 
reputation. Everything you do is supposed to be right, and it’s supposed to be done 
right the first time you do it. I think the French people are suffering under this form for 
mentality (Informant no.1).  
 
To get a bad reputation means weaken position in the transactional relationship. Dasgupta 
(1988, p.56) argues that trust is based on reputation. You don’t trust a person to do something 
merely because he says he will do so. You trust him because, knowing what you know of his 
disposition, his information, his ability option and their consequences, you expect him to 
choose to do so. Sørhaug (1996) argues that if you are seen or used by people with a higher 
competence than yourself, your competence accumulates. In all bureaucracies, vertical 
visibility is important. It’s important to get attention and trust from people higher up in the 
hierarchy. Horizontal visibility is of importance too, but it’s always a vital competition in the 
organization for vertical visibility. One informant told how he was going crazy over some 
French employees who always tried to show the manager in meetings that he had some 
information; “It was almost like a kinder garden. Often in meetings, people just said 
something only to show the managers that he knew that” (Informant no. 4). This visibility can 
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also be called respect, reputation or a name. A reputation or a name gives social credit or right 
to trust. A person without a name must therefore find a person that is big enough to share their 
name (Sørhaug, 1996). Sørhaug (1996) says that transactional relationships can be developed 
to a form of patron- client- relationship. The patron may also boost their name through their 
client’s capability. This form of relationship consists of a form for exchange. The manager 
rewards the employee with recognition and enables the employee to climb the ladders in the 
hierarchy if the employee fulfils its part of the agreement. The employee shows their manager 
or patron dedication, respect and loyalty and let their work shine upon the manager. When 
exchange relationship is based on terms of trade which makes it beneficial to behave in a 
trustworthy way, it will be rational to maintain the patron- client relations. If one of the parties 
gets a bad reputation, it will affect the other party in this relationship. The client may no 
longer be linked to a patron with a big enough name to share, while the patron may lose their 
confident in their client competence and capability. Since calculus-based trust is fragile 
(Lewicki and Bunker, 1996, p.121), a bad reputation may result in elimination of trust.  
 
6.1.4 Information as Power 
In an exchange, or a transactional relationship, each individual seeks to improve his or her 
position by trading with other individuals. Power in an exchange model comes from 
controlling resources desired by others (March, 1994). Resources the employee may possess 
are knowledge and information. This knowledge or information can be used to strengthen 
your position in the transactional relationship, making yourself more valuable for the 
manager. It seems that a consequence of this transactional relationship in French 
organizations is that employees seem less willing to share knowledge and information with 
other employees. One informant told that he had a rough start in the company because he 
didn’t get much help from the other employees, “they didn’t want to give me something for 
free” (Informant no.1). This is not surprising, considering sharing information involves giving 
up power by sharing your resources. You make yourself vulnerable in the exchange 
relationship when sharing information with others. Making yourself vulnerable means that 
you take a risk, and one risk may be that you reduce your vertical visibility. You can’t predict 
if the other party will act opportunistic. Neither economic nor behavioral theories are 
optimistic about trust existing in relationship where one party is vulnerable of the power of 
the other (Hardy, Phillips & Lawrence, 1998,p. 83). As one informant said “In France, I feel 
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that people hold their cards close to the chest, you hold on to information, because it gives an 
opportunity to influence”(Informant no. 1). Since the relationship between the transactional 
manager and the employee is based on sanctions and rewards, vertical visibility is even more 
important. One informant stated “The employees are very concerned about taking credit and 
honor for the work they have done. You don’t want to give anything free to the other 
employees”(Informant no. 6). 
 
The French manager’s logic of transactional management reinforces the masculine values in 
the organization. Even though, Hofstede characterizes France as a relative feminine country, 
which is mainly because of the country’s welfare system. The relationship between 
employees is more characterized by competition, achievement, strive for success and being 
the best in your field (The Hofstede Centre, 2014). They hold on to the resources they possess 
to increase the vertical visibility to harvest rewards and avoid sanctions. These masculine 
values have a clear link to the values of the French education system. The masculine values 
and the transactional management limit the development of trust relations to the higher levels 
of the trust, because the people in the organization hold the cards close to their chest. When 
the relationships in the organization are based on this form of power, impersonal trust 
relations are likely to occur. When impersonal trust is present in the relationship, the parties 
have fewer incentives to develop personal trust in (Bachmann, 2003, p.70). Building of 
personal trust takes an effort and it may be an easier option to use the resources you possess 
instead. Withhold of information also decreases the possibilities for trust relations to involve. 
The premises for trust relations to knowledge- based and identification- based level are non- 
existing when people withhold information.  
 
6.1.5 Informal Networks and Trust  
As discussed above, most trust relations in transactional management are established at a 
calculus-based level and have an impersonal form. But, this does not mean that all relations in 
French organizations are of this form of character. As we described in the previous chapter, 
there are a lot of informal networks in French organizations. Through these informal networks 
the employees can influence decision making processes, but to do this they must have the 
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right connections. As one informant described it “it’s important to know the right people and 
have the right information. You have to play with the right hand”(Informant no. 2). We argue 
that the trust in these informal networks may develop to a knowledge-based level, because it 
is in these networks employees share information with others. As mentioned, the informal 
networks are often formed by people with similar background, and the trust seems 
predetermined in these relations as one of our informants described it. Individuals that shared 
norms, values and socialized experiences are likely to hold a common understanding and set 
of expectations that’s required to establish and maintaining trust at knowledge-based level 
(Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010, p.19). The trust builds on familiarity from common experiences 
and values from their time at the Grandes Ecoles, augmented by one informant who said ”for 
those that haven’t attended the right school it’s hard to get into these networks” (Informant 
no.5). This familiarity may also be the cause of trust relations of a more personal form. The 
personal trust will encourage more information sharing between the employees since you 
understand and know each other, since the predictability, created through knowledge and 
personal trust, reduces the risk of information sharing. When you know someone, it’s easier to 
predict their behavior. It’s easier to expect and evaluate if the co- worker will behave 
opportunistic, and potentially use the information given to promote himself on your expense.  
 
6.2 Transformational Management 
We argue that transformational management will promote a higher level of trust than 
calculus-based trust. The transformational managers build their relationships with their 
employees on more than exchange. The literature on transformational management differ 
somewhat on the specific behavior they associate with transformational management, but all 
of them share a common perspective that effective managers transform or change the basic 
values, beliefs, and attitudes of followers, that’s make them willing to perform beyond the 
minimum levels specified by the organization (Podsakoff, MacKenzi Moorman & Fetter, 
1990). In transformational management, the employees do A or B, because the employees 
share the same values as the manager (Sørhaug, 2004). From a value oriented rational view, 
actions in accordance to the shared values are rational behavior. The flat structures in the 
organization make mobilization of values an important resource for the management. Clear 
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values can compensate for the “fuzzy” and flexible organizational boundaries and patterns of 
tasks (Sørhaug, 2004, p.255).  
 
The relationships in transformational management are managed by trust, while the 
transactional relationship is managed by the terms of trade. We argue that the 
transformational managers therefore will contribute to trust relations at higher levels than 
calculus-based trust, and even identification- based trust may occur in some relations in the 
organization. As described, the transformational manager can be summarized in four 
dimensions; idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual and individual 
stimulation (Judge & Piccolo, 2004). We argue that these dimensions contain similar 
characteristics as the legitimacy of the Norwegian manager. As mentioned, the Norwegian 
manager legitimacy is depended on support from the employees and trade unions 
representative. The managers’ legitimacy is about the managers’ ability to give praise, pass on 
information, influence and motivate the employees to come with new ideas (Falkum et al., 
2009). In Norwegian organizations, the managers are dependent on acceptance and support 
for a decision to be implemented, and this acceptance needs to come from both the employees 
and trade union representatives. One informant described how he first got to know and 
focused on building trust with the trade union representatives and Health and Safety Officer 
(Verneombudet) almost before the management team he was a part of, because “it’s extremely 
important to have a good trust relationship with them” (Informant no. 5). Thus, the whole 
organization’s results depend significantly on the manager’s legitimacy within the 
organization. The accordance between the organization’s results and the manager’s intentions 
are an expression of power (Falkum et al., 2009). Under transactional management, the one 
who holds the resources that the other party wants, possess the power. In a more democratic 
work life like Norway, the acceptance and support from the employees are a necessity for the 
managers’ exert of power (Falkum, 2008, p.104 ref. in Falkum et al, 2009).  
 
6.2.1 Idealized Influence and Inspirational Motivation 
The two dimensions, idealized influence and inspirational motivation, concern the ways the 
manager acts i) to make the employees follow and ii) to motivate their employees to share and 
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work for the organization’s goal and vision (Judge & Piccolo, 2004). To be able to influence 
and motivate the employees, the manager needs to be able to communicate, and through own 
behavior set an example and promote the right values the employees should engage in. As 
portrayed in chapter five, our informants characterized the Norwegian manager as being open 
and democratic, and emphasized that the employees can challenge their managers. As one 
informant stated: 
As a manager, you have to behave in a way that ensures trust with the people you 
work with. The opposite will mean that you won’t be able to do your job. With trust 
you get openness, and openness is a precondition for trust. When you have openness 
you bring out peoples’ opinions and you can create the best product (Informant no. 2).  
 
Communication is an important aspect of both the inspirational motivation and idealized 
influence dimension. Through open dialogue with both the employees and trade unions 
representative, the manager can encourage a culture where the employees can express their 
opinions and have an open dialogue with their managers. ”Openness isn’t just about telling, 
it’s about to dare to say what you mean and that it won’t lead to bad consequences for you 
after. That’s maybe the most important” (Informant no.5). This is an important aspect of the 
environment that the transformational manager creates. The statement stresses the contrast of 
the environment of the transactional manager, where we have described that the relationship 
between employee and mangers is to a large extent built on fear. Trust is closely related to the 
experience of stability, safety and predictability in the work situation (Schiefloe, 2013, p.266), 
and one way the transformational manager can create an environment that welcomes the 
opinions of the employees is to act in accordance with the Model of Collaboration. The 
manager can create an area where all the three parties, employees, trade unions 
representatives, and manager, can express their opinions. As described in the last chapter, 
inclusion of the employees and trade unions representatives are the norm rather than the 
exception in Norwegian organizations. These interactions between the parties, through close 
cooperation and dialogue, create closeness between the parties.  For trust relations to develop 
from a calculus-based level to knowledge-based level it needs a form for closeness in the 
relationship: if the relationship always stays at an “arm- length”, the parties may not move 
past a calculus-based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). This is in accordance with one of our 
informants who stated; ”closeness creates trust” (Informant no.2). We argue that openness 
and inclusion between the three parties will not only stabilize trust, but also enhance trust. As 
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we will discuss in this chapter, the trust relations will be established at knowledge-based 
level, and in some cases at identification-based level.  
 
We have already described that the transformational manager articulate certain values with 
their employees that they come to share (Sørhaug, 2004). According to Bass (1990), the 
employees look up to the transformational manager and identify with the manager. Since 
identification-based trust is based on identification with the other’s desires and intentions 
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1996, p.122), a transformational manager can create trust relations in the 
organization at the identification-based level. To engage the employees and make them work 
towards the organization’s goals, the manager has to take advantage of employee participation 
and representative systems. Employee participation is a fundamental value in the Norwegian 
work life. In Norwegian work life, the manager’s legitimacy is directly linked to the collective 
and individual influence of the employees. Participation and co-determination of the 
employees will strength the managers ability to realize his or hers’ intentions, and with that 
the mangers power (Falkum et al., 2009). The exclusion of employee participation in 
decision-making process can be considered as an irrational action that may likely demolish 
the managers’ legitimacy and decision-making power.  
 
In Norway, the strong anchoring of employee participation in decision-making processes will 
greatly affect the employees’ commitment to the organization. Through participation and 
involvement in the decision-making processes, the employees are empowered and can 
attribute to the direction the organization is going. It is a clear and positive correlation 
between co-determination, cooperation and influence of employees, and the will to participate 
and contribute to change in the organizations in Norway (Falkum et al., 2009). The 
empowerment of the employees through these systems in decision-making processes may 
make the employees feel responsible for the outcome and therefore willing to go the extra 
mile. This empowerment can lead to increased meaning of the employees’ everyday work. 
When their work therefore feels more meaningful are the employees more likely to commit to 
the organization’s goals and ambitions. Many of the same activities that build and strengthen 
calculus-based and knowledge-based trust also serve to identification-based trust. But 
identification-based trust demands some additional activities. Creation of mutual goals and 
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committing to commonly shared values are two of them (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Thus, the 
integrated system of employee participation creates an understanding and gives the employees 
knowledge of the organizations as a whole. Trust can exist at identification-based level since 
the parties effectively understand and appreciate the other’s wants; this mutual understanding 
is developed to a point where they can effectively act for each other (Lewicki & Bunker, 
1996, p.130).  
 
The work processes in Norway are characterized by teamwork and cooperation. As one 
informant described the work process in Norway:  
We are here in Norway used to team building. We have from early on learned to play 
each other better (…). What characterizes the processes are cooperation and that we 
help others to perform. We use other as resources and trust that others have 
competence too (Informant no.6).    
 
According to Hartog (2003), trust influences the employees’ behavior towards groups and 
teams in the organization, and how willing they are to put an effort in these groups. Working 
in teams means an interdependence of co- workers, and this interdependence makes it more 
likely that the employees in Norway share information and knowledge to a larger extent than 
co- workers in French organizations. One informant made an interesting comparison about 
France and Norway. Similar to what we have discussed above, the informant described his 
experiences about how the French employees thought that knowledge is power, and how they 
could position themselves, and how they are more likely to win “the race” if they don’t share 
this information. The informant described next how Norwegian employees front their career: 
In the Norwegian work life, to share knowledge and ensure that the work is being done 
through sharing knowledge is considered more valuable for the organization. And it 
will be noticed if to reach results and get through tough processes, are through 
cooperation and sharing knowledge (…) this will give you more opportunities in your 
career, than if you keep your knowledge to yourself (Informant no.5).   
 
This statement illustrates our point on how information and knowledge are not in the same 
way a source of power as in French organizations. In Norwegian organizations the knowledge 
and information are more collectively based and a source for the team to reach their own and 
the organization’s goals. When team members trust their managers, they might feel more 
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comfortable with sharing their knowledge, without fear and suspicion. As discussed about the 
informal networks in French organizations, sharing knowledge may lead to trust relations at 
the knowledge- based level that will increase the predictability of peoples’ behavior. The 
predetermined trust in the French informal networks, based on, for instance, the same 
background from the Grandes Ecoles, is established more generally in the Norwegian 
organizations. As described, Norway has a high level of trust, and this is indubitable a 
competitive advantaged (Levin et al., 2012). This high level of trust makes it also easier to 
develop both a form for personal trust and higher levels of trust similar to the informal 
networks in French organizations. The work processes in Norwegian organizations, 
characterized by cooperation and teamwork, enhance the development of personal trust since 
they share information and frequently interact with each other.   
 
6.2.2 Individual and Intellectual Stimulation  
One important aspect of individual stimulation is individual adjustment to every employee in 
the work situation. In the Norwegian work life, individual adjustment of the employee is a 
fundamental principle. Individual adjustment is secured in law and agreements, but also 
through different arrangement in the work life. The Work Environment Act makes the 
manager responsible for, and obligated to, organize and adjust the work for individual 
employee based on their age, competence and other preconditions (Trygstad & Bråten, 2011). 
For the manager to be able to make adjustment for the employees, the manager needs to have 
knowledge about the individual. The managers in Norway are obligated to have some 
knowledge about certain condition, but to create individual stimulation the manager may need 
to go beyond these obligations. In organizations that act in accordance with the legislation, 
agreements and arrangements will exchange important information and knowledge between 
the employee and manager. 
 
Individual adjustment based on the employees’ competence will motivate the employees. The 
Norwegian work processes are knowledge based, with a comprehensive use of technology 
and highly competent employees (Levin et al., 2012). According to Sørhaug (2004), the 
managers’ challenge is to transform the employees’ knowledge to competence, that is to say, 
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to translate the knowledge to be used to concrete tasks. This can only be done properly if the 
manager has the relevant information about the employee’s knowledge. The openness in the 
organizations as discussed above is an important precondition that has to be established if the 
managers want the employees to elaborate on their strengths and weaknesses. Openness is 
thus important for the manager’s capability to stimulate the employee, both individually and 
intellectually. The Norwegian manager has reputedly been described as democratic by our 
informants. But to be a successful democratic manager, you need to take advantage of the 
total competence in the organizations (Levin et al., 2012). This confirmed by one of our 
informants, stating “In Norway, it will be an unwise thing not to treat the employees as 
associate of knowledge”(Informant, no. 2). The inclusion of the employees in decision-
making processes is one of the main ways the manager can use the employees’ competence. 
Involvement and wide participation make it possible for “everyone” in the organization to 
contribute to development and innovation (Levin et al., 2012). 80 per cent of the Norwegian 
managers in a management research stated that their employees had a better competence than 
themselves (Strand, 2007, p. 503, ref. in Levin et al., 2012). This recognition indicates a high 
level of trust in the employees’ competence, which enables flexibility and promotes 
egalitarian structures. In Norway, the manager “wants to play on the team with the employees 
and belong in the group”(Informant, no. 3). Hofstede makes a similar description of the 
manager- employee relationship in Norway when he says that power is decentralized and that 
the managers count on the experiences of their employees, while the employees count on 
being consulted (The Hofstede Centre, 2014).  
 
For the organization to be innovative, you have to have employees that engage and involve, 
and take initiative. Autonomy and initiative are maybe the most important characteristics of 
the Norwegian work life, because it creates the foundation for innovation and development 
(Levin et al., 2012). To succeed with this, the discussions above about creating a culture 
where the employees can participate and express their opinion are critical component for 
innovation and development. The manager needs to believe and trust the employees’ 
capabilities, because employee participation consists of an element of risk. Employee 
participation means a step out in the unknown (Levin et al., 2012, p.188), so the relations 
between the manager and the employee need to contain trust. As mentioned, managers need to 
have a certain amount of information about the employee to be able to stimulate the employee 
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individually and intellectually. Individualized considerations ensure the exchange of 
information about needs and wants, expectations and other elements that knowledge- based 
trust depends on (Hartog, 2003, p.130).  
 
6.3 Trust Relations Between Employees 
We have mainly looked at the effect transactional management and transformational 
management has on trust relations between managers and employees. But what about the trust 
relations between the employees? Based on our discussion, it seems like the trust relations 
between employees in French organizations are substantially less developed than in 
Norwegian organizations. The logic of transactional management can be said to be the reason 
for this. When information is a resource for power, and people hold their cards close to the 
chest, the foundation for trust development to knowledge- or identification- based trust are 
absent. The information to predict the co- worker behavior is not existing, thus to trust others 
in the organization is connected with risk. The competition and strive for vertical visibility 
may suggest that people will use their resources to gain benefits on the cost of others. Since 
the employees can’t predict the other employees’ behavior, that is, to calculate their behavior, 
it will be irrational to trust the other employee. The bi- effect of transformational manager is 
not only trust between employees and manager, but also between the employees. But, as 
discusses above, this may not count for all the relations between the employees. It’s likely 
that the trust relations in the informal networks can develop to knowledge- based level of 
trust, because of the information sharing and their common background. These trust relations 
in the informal networks in French organizations may be more similar to the ones between the 
employees in Norwegian organizations, at least compared to the trust relations between 
employees in the formal networks in French organizations. The environment in Norwegian 
organizations is characterized by openness and information flow; the right conditions are at 
place for the development of trust. And furthermore, the short power distance, and 
cooperative work processes create a large degree of closeness between the organizations 
members.  
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6.4 Concluding Remarks 
We have in this chapter examined how the two logics of transactional- and transformational 
management affect trust relations in the organizations, mainly between manager- employee 
relations but also the relations between employees. As a conclusion, we have found support 
for our assumptions through the theoretical framework, but also cases of variance.   
We assumed that trust relations in French organizations are more strongly characterized by a 
calculus-based trust and impersonal trust compared to Norwegian organizations. We also 
assumed that transactional management will contribute to strengthening this form and level of 
trust, and even limit a further development to a higher level. From our findings in interviews 
with Norwegian employees and managers with work experience from France and Norway, 
and from relevant literature, we conclude from our discussion that the assumptions to a large 
extent are supported. The terms of trade contribute to calculative behavior of the parties, and 
create a constant competition for vertical visibility and self-promotion to strengthen the own 
position in the relationship. Failure will lead to sanctions, while good work will be rewarded. 
French employees appear more afraid of doing mistakes and to obtain a bad reputation that 
will weaken their position in the exchange relationship. As a consequence, the employees 
hold on to their resources by not sharing information, which eliminate the foundation for trust 
relations to develop to higher levels. In addition to this, the control mechanism which the 
transactional relationship is based on, will also contribute to an impersonal form of trust. 
Since the control mechanism ensures trust relations based on compliance (with the right 
control mechanism, the rational behavior is to act in accordance with the transactions), the 
parties don’t have incentives to do the effort it takes to develop a personal form of trust. The 
low level of trust between the managers and employees in French organizations leads to a low 
level of trust between employees. We argue that it is in the informal networks the conditions 
for trust at knowledge-based level exist, because of the information sharing. The trust 
relations in these networks are likely to be of a more personal form rather than impersonal. 
 
We assumed that trust relations in Norwegian organizations will be at the knowledge-based 
level and in some cases at the identifications-based level. The more the Norwegian 
transformational manager will contribute to trust relations at these levels and even enhance 
trust through the manager’s legitimacy, in conformity with the four dimensions of 
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transformational management. Our interview findings and subsequent discussion indicate that 
it’s especially the openness, low power distance, employee participation, and work and 
decision processes in the organizations that stabilize trust relations. Through employee 
participation, the employees come to share the organization’s values and obtain an 
understanding of the organizations as a whole, which promote trust at the second and third 
level of the trust model. These factors will also contribute to personal trust relations. The high 
level of trust between the managers and employees facilitates a high level of trust between 
employees as well, because the right conditions are in place for this development.   
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7  An Institutional Framework 
Many of our informants seemed to have shared views of how different processes are carried 
out in France and Norway. Both decision-making, trust relations and management style were 
described alike, and explained as to simply “the way it happens” around there, without further 
questioning. They all seem to share worlds-in-common where certain things are accepted. In 
order for us to explain how this could be, and why different levels of trust seem not only 
expected but also accepted, we have chosen an institutional framework. It allows us to look at 
the organizations with “living lenses”, not something “dead” as Berger & Luckmann (1967, p. 
75 ref. in Scott 2008, p. 49) have stated.  
 
“Institutionalization involves the processes by which social processes, obligations, or 
actualities come to take on a rulelike status in social thought and action” (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977, p. 341). 
 
7.1 Institutionalism and Trust  
Bachmann (2003) reflects on how trust and new institutionalism integrate. He elaborates on 
how someone makes a choice to have positive assumptions about another actor. In other 
words, a trustor places positive assumptions of a trustee’s future behavior. The trustor 
communicates this selection, and signals that he is ready to make generous and favorable 
decisions, even though he has limited knowledge of the other actor’s true motives. When he 
invests trust, he also bears a certain amount of risk, as he cannot know the trustee’s future 
behavior. Bachmann makes an interesting point, stating that trust will never be built on 
complete information. This was mentioned in chapter five. If complete information were 
available, trust itself would not be necessary (Bachmann, 2003). But the amount of available 
knowledge, possible risk or profit and investment of trust are all tied together. Thus, 
Bachmann (2003) states, it’s reasonable to believe that all social actors make a rough 
calculation based on the three mentioned factors. These calculations may look different, 
depending on context.  
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We argue that the calculations are different in Norway and France simply because the actual 
available knowledge, the considered risk and the way trust is invested all differ. Chapter five 
emphasized how channels of information are more unidirectional in France and more open in 
Norway. This has again been tied to different styles of management. In France, the 
hierarchical structures and extensive elitism have lead to an implicit autocracy where the 
manager holds all information. Whatever knowledge other employees may have is considered 
valuable and as an object of trade, or something you keep to yourself for own personal 
gaining - either to climb the latter of recognition, or to keep others from doing it. An 
informant states, “information is somehow power, and they [the French] are capable to hold 
on to it and seek it”(Informant no.2). In Norway, low power distance and flat organizational 
structure seem to have lead to a significant closeness between managers and employees. 
These institutional features lead to trust development, not only between manager and 
employee, but also between employee and employee. “We are more used to team building in 
Norway. We learn how to play each other good early, it’s also evident in the school system” 
(Informant no.6). Information is seen as necessary to keep every employee on board, in order 
for them to share overall organizational goals and values. Knowledge between employees is 
considered valuable to share; it will help cooperation and teamwork. It is not kept for personal 
gaining. Thus, we assume that the information sharing, communication and other features of 
the organizational structures are closely related to the trust relations. It is more out in the 
open.  
 
Risk consideration has also been explained in this study, with help from Hofstede. There are 
several factors indicating that France wants to avoid every possible risk, as they seek every 
possible solution in decision-making and managers are quite detailed. The general low level 
of trust presented by World Values Survey (2006) also indicates low risk seeking, as the two 
terms relate. If you do not invest trust, you don’t have anything to risk either. To emphasize a 
rather rational thinking is also a way of reducing risk, as the logic of rationality is supposed to 
catch and even reduce or eliminate this risk. According to Hofstede, Norwegians are moderate 
risk seekers, which is also indicated by a more pragmatic decision-making and autonomy to 
employees (The Hofstede Centre, 2014). The higher level of general trust also leads to more 
risk.  These differences lead to different kinds of calculating when an actor decides whether to 
invest trust. We have already stated in the end of chapter five that France has a calculus-based 
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trust. Thus, according to the Lewicki & Bunker’s (1996) three-level model and Bachmann 
(2003), Norwegians also perform some sort of calculations, even though we argue that they 
are located at knowledge or even identification based trust. We see that the reasoning and 
calculating have quite different preconditions in Norway and France.  
This is where institutionalism enters. When social actors mentally calculate, what are the 
good reasons to decide to invest trust? Bachman follows Luhmann’s arguments (1979, ref. in 
Bachmann, 2003) about norms to answer the question. When actors are operating in an 
environment with clear and reliable norms, a trustor usually finds good reasons to trust 
another actor, who is also familiar with the norms. The potential sanctions are to remain 
latent; they should not be used to threat or even be considered – it should be sufficient that 
they are accepted. These legal norms exist in the institutional environment of organizations. 
In the actual structures of organizations, social rules are incorporated. They appear as 
distribution of responsibilities, patterns of division of work, and agreements on work duties, 
as well as conflict resolutions and other practices. These rules constitute internal structural 
frameworks of the organization, which help to channel behavior. In the same way as legal 
norms, social rules entail a normative dimension of sanctions, which should not be activated 
to be functional. When the rules are well functioning, members again find good reasons to 
believe that the risk of investing trust in other actors of the same organization is relatively 
low, as future behavior can be predicted (Bachmann, 2003, p. 61).  
 
7.1.1 Worlds-in-Common 
The social rules’ most vital function is to provide a shared cultural and social framework of 
meaning, in addition to a common set of interpretation categories. This will again lead to 
worlds-in-common, which is what several of our informants described. It could be interpreted 
almost as expectations. According to Bachmann (2003) these worlds-in-common play an 
eminent role in trust building in organization. They (the worlds-in-common) are naturally 
present in both Norway and France, but also they operate in quite different ways. In Norway, 
people from all levels in the organization are expected to be included equally. The flat 
organizational structures and low power distance are illustrations of this. In France, 
interestingly enough, every employee from all levels of the organization seems to accept an 
unequal distribution of inclusion. The French world-in-common operates with hierarchy and 
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high power distance. Trade unions, managers, employees and representatives are all sharing 
the same understanding of reality, where different roles include different significance. This 
could help explain why French employees accept a low inclusion. One of our informants 
simply stated, “they are used to it”(Informant no.2), when we asked how the French 
employees coped with this. It’s internalized. The rules, norms and latent sanctions and a 
common understanding of reality are all characteristics that lead to these worlds-in-common, 
where everyone acknowledges and accepts the characteristics. It could also explain the 
different levels of trust, as the characteristics lead to an understanding of how things are done. 
This will be elaborated in a subsequent section under Scott’s (2008) cultural-cognitive pillar.  
 
7.1.2 Third Party Guarantor of Trust 
Bachmann & Inkpen (2007) give several examples to when institutions are decisive for 
building trust. They state that trust usually has been explained at micro-level, where two or 
more actors interact. In this tradition, institutions’ role has not been acknowledged with any 
form of influence. Bachmann & Inkpen (2007) seek to examine when and how institutions are 
actually shaping processes of trust. In this study we have earlier separated personal and 
impersonal trust. Bachmann & Inkpen (2007) do the same, and suggest that personal trust is 
consisted with more attitudes, while impersonal trust, or institutional, is based on a trustor 
making a decision to trust. They emphasize that it is not the original notion of trust in 
institutions, where institutions become objects, but rather trust that individual or collective 
actors develop with reference to specific institutions (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2007, p. 3). We 
argue that this type of trust is consistent with what our informants have shared about French 
organizations. This is in contrast to the more personal trust in Norway, with features such as 
high level of trust in the society and emphasis on equality between actors. As we have 
elaborated on several times, Bachmann (2003) states that with complete information, which is 
what French organizations seem to seek, trust is superfluous. In addition, low score on general 
trust from World Values Survey, high risk avoidance, a desire of full information coverage in 
decision-making and powerful hierarchy all indicates that French organizations function with 
impersonal trust. As Bachmann & Inkpen (2007) state, there can never be no trust in 
organizations either. What we argue is that the institutions surrounding the actors’ behavior 
primarily function as a sort of third-party trust guarantor. Zucker (1986) is one of several who 
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elaborate on third-party guarantor in trust processes. She states that if actors do not have 
enough information about each other, a third party could provide knowledge, which would 
“secure” the trust building. This third party does not have to be an actual person. In fact, 
Bachmann & Inkpen (2007) argue that institutions might serve better, especially in cases 
where the trust involves impersonal structures. Institutions would then both facilitate and 
encourage trustworthy behavior between actors (Zucker, 1986 ref. in Bachmann & Inkpen, 
2007). This is possible as the institutional structures provide the earlier mentioned world-in-
common, shared knowledge and familiarity. Actors trust each other because these institutional 
arrangements help predict future behavior.   
 
In their article, Bachmann & Inkpen (2007) give several examples to when institutions are not 
only facilitating, but actually creating trust. One of them is called swift trust, and describes 
situations when it is inappropriate in terms of effort, time and energy to try to establish 
personal trust. It appears to be consistent with French organizations, as they seem to find it 
inappropriate to develop personal trust. Our informants state that fellow colleagues don’t get 
involved personally; they keep their social distance. Personal life and work are kept very 
separate, which could help explain why personal trust in organizations is quite low. It can also 
explain why the French has not reached a knowledge-based trust level, as it requires that 
information and knowledge be shared with each other. As we have elaborated on earlier, 
French employees seem to keep knowledge and information to themselves as objects of trade. 
But as Bachmann & Inkpen (2007) emphasize, there can never be zero trust in any transaction 
either, a minimum of trust is always required in any kind of interaction. In this context that 
would be what we have already described as calculus-based, and what Bachmann & Inkpen 
(2007) call contract based. Instead of spending time on deciding to invest trust or not, the 
French can fall back on institutional risk absorption.  It is the institution that creates trust – the 
third-party is an institutional safeguard (Zucker, 1986, ref. in Bachmann & Inkpen, 2007).   
 
In Norway, the third-party guarantor comes in different shapes. We argue that while 
institutions substitutes for lacking trust in France, the third-party in Norway is more invisible 
as the level of trust is high. Levin et al. (2012) say that for example employees’ autonomy and 
high level of responsibility is traditionally something that “everyone” has looked upon as 
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natural.  The Norwegian Model of Collaboration in Work Life, with union representatives, 
employers and employees, is so institutionalized that it also functions as a safeguard. The 
mutual acceptance and recognition from all parties helps predict future behavior. The close 
cooperation and interdependence will create an environment for trust to stabilize.   
 
7.2 Applying Scott’s pillars 
Bachmann’s (2003) theoretical approach to understand trust in organizations, with norms and 
rules, is inspired by certain aspects developed within the framework of neo institutionalism. 
Also Bachmann & Inkpen (2007) emphasize how neo institutionalism has an increased 
interest in forms of trust, which is not inclusively focused on interaction processes between 
social actors. As mentioned in chapter 3, Scott’s (2008) three pillars of institutions seek to 
explain why people act the way they do, and how and why they are legalized. They are ways 
to analyze structure and behavior. We argue that both Norwegian and French organizations 
are relatively stable social systems. According to Scott, we observe practices in stable social 
systems that is constituted of and empowered because they are taken for granted, normative 
approved and supported by authority power (Scott, 2008). Institutions should not be examined 
with only one of the pillars, as they are all more or less active. They are interrelated, and 
define institutions together – they explain why institutions function the way they do. Still, one 
of them will be the more dominant.  
 
7.2.1 The Regulative Pillar 
The first pillar is mainly concerned with laws and rules. Some are created by individuals who 
hope they will advance their interests; other laws are formally grounded by law. They can 
establish ideological standpoints, as well as moral and ethical judgments as generally 
applicable. Individuals also seek to conform these laws and rules because they want to avoid 
possible sanctions, or because they seek rewards (Scott, 2008). 
The information our informants have given us about French organizations indicate that these 
mainly comply with this pillar. The trust, as mentioned earlier, can be described as calculus-
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based, with monitoring, rewards and control. This suits well with a regulative pillar 
perspective. Some of the aspects of transactional management, as mentioned in chapter six, 
could also be said to be dominated by the regulative pillar. The management style and its 
characteristics based on exchange have a predictability aspect. The regulative pillar wish to 
explore how institutions constrain and regularize behavior (Scott, 2008). As discussed, the 
managers, who executes an authorized coercive power based on exchange, enjoys a 
considerable amount of respect. “It’s interesting to observe, you get enormous respect. In the 
beginning no one even dared to come into my office without knocking and bowing, it was like 
they had to make an appointment for all kinds of chitchatting” (Informant no.5). The 
transactional management could be said to be decisive in the constraining and regularizing of 
behavior, as this quote describes the high amount of respect. It fits with what the pillar calls 
informal rules. In French organizations, employee’s superiors are the ones who can give 
recognition and possible advancements. This was further explained in chapter six about 
transactional management. The status the managers entail as a consequence of the informal 
rules also leads to a one-way channeled influence. What the manager wants doesn’t require 
any further jurisdiction, as he’s sitting on all the power. “When we decide to drain the swamp, 
we don’t ask for permission from the frogs” (A quote from a senior manager in Barsoux & 
Lawrence, 1991).  
 
The underlying logic of this pillar is instrumental, which makes it attractive to rational and 
economic theorists. It also fits a French perspective, and especially the education system, 
which adores rational values like logic, intellect, math and Cartesianism. According to Scott 
(2008), feelings of fear are likely to occur if actors are not able to fully comprehend the social 
rules within this pillar. This is consistent with descriptions of French organizations, and the 
fear culture. Also the decision-making processes which we have elaborated on earlier, seems 
to match with the instrumental logic. Lastly, it seems to facilitate a more impersonal trust, 
which is consistent with calculus-based trust.  
 
We argue that in Norway, the factors that constitute the regulative pillar, such as the Work 
Environment Act, the Basic Agreement and other agreements, are more implicitly, but equally 
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important affecting trust. Also the Model of Collaboration was mentioned by several 
informants as a powerful formal law: 
The Model of Collaboration is very important. It plays an extremely central role. In 
relation to authority, companies and union representatives. That collaboration is not 
just something on a piece of paper, it actually works. In Norwegian collaboration is it 
extremely important. (…) It’s about having trust. Trust is a very important concept in 
Norwegian collaboration I think (Informant no.5).  
 
Falkum et al. (2009) show that more than 90 per cent of employers and employees in 
Norwegian work life recognize the labor laws and basic agreements. The system of 
collaboration is highly supported, and highly accepted. Despite that, not a lot of people have 
much knowledge of the different agreements (Falkum et al., 2009). It could be discussed if it 
so because the labor regulations are so institutionalized in the work life that they are taken for 
given even by unorganized employers and employees. Collective agreements and rights are 
taken for granted. Again as Bachmann (2003) states, if you actively use laws as sanctions, the 
rules would lose its legitimacy and importance, and the trust would decrease. Hence, it could 
be argued that the high level of personal trust in Norway makes formal laws and rules more of 
a foundation, as a facilitating role of trust relations and work life in general. It is easy to 
imagine that a more contract or calculus-based trust is more impersonal. Expectations of 
influence and possibility to affect your own work space, which is grounded by law, are 
institutionalized features of Norwegian employees (Falkum et al., 2009). There is a low level 
of monitoring and sanctioning, as level of personal trust is high. Managers in Norwegian 
organizations have power, but it is shared with employees and the organization in a higher 
degree than any other country (Falkum & Bygdås, 2012). It is through systems, arrangements 
and democratically grounded laws (Falkum et al., 2009).  
 
7.2.2 The Normative Pillar  
The normative pillar is concerned with norms and values. It emphasizes how some 
organizational values are applicable to the entire organization, while some values and norms 
apply to selected groups. It is also concerned with roles and expectations. The actors will 
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internalize an external pressure of expectations, which again will construct a moral 
monitoring of them. Thus, legitimacy is morally governed (Scott, 2008). 
After conducting our interviews, we found that the development of roles has been mostly 
evident in French organizations, especially the informal roles. The status and reputation of 
coming from a Grandes Ecoles has been inevitable for us to elaborate on. The normative pillar 
helps us describe how their legitimacy is accepted. Our informants said that managers coming 
from Grandes Ecoles are entitled higher salaries than other managers performing the same 
tasks. So the exact same position can lead to different salaries, depending on your school. An 
interesting aspect of the Grandes Ecoles’ status is that it is legitimized and accepted - not only 
by the managers themselves, but also by others who didn’t attend them. The status of Grandes 
Ecoles provides a cultural league that is appreciated and considered necessary among every 
level of society (Barsoux & Lawrence, 1991). A manager’s reputation, which is also 
institutionalized, is emphasized in the calculus-based trust. As that kind of trust is based on 
trusting other actors to do what they are supposed to do, their reputation is at stake if they 
don’t. We have earlier elaborated on how the informal networks are functioning in France. A 
bad reputation would spread like a fire in these networks. At the same time, these informal 
networks or structures are also very protective. As mentioned, an informant stated that he 
knew several managers in his department that shouldn’t have leading roles, but who kept their 
positions simply because they were protected by their fellow Grandes Ecoles colleagues. The 
Grandes Ecoles unifies an elite in French organizations, where the virile values are 
networking, dominance, hierarchy and decisiveness (Barsoux & Lawrence, 1991, Mangset, 
2004). 
 
Both the formal and the informal structures based on values are flatter in Norway. As an 
informant states “But [in France], the hierarchy and the fact that you are afraid of sharing 
information and knowledge…it slows down the trust-creating collaboration which is present 
in Norwegian work life”. The role expectations are quite distinct. As mentioned, “everyone” 
shares the view of the Model of Collaboration’s importance, and “everyone” is expecting 
equality in organizational life. People from every level should be included, and the manager’s 
role is to facilitate and involve.  
Norwegian managers are very including, there’s a pretty flat manager structure as I 
sense it. They are pretty good at delegate – that is, they can work through their 
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coworkers. We are also concerned with things like work environment, good relations 
and employees’ co-determination (Informant no.2). 
 
Sejersted (1997 ref. in Hagen & Trygstad, 2007) suggests that the law of jante (Janteloven) 
which is well embedded in Norwegian society, has restricted what Norwegians approve as 
their managers. The law includes statements such as “you’re not to think you’re anything 
special”, “you’re not to think you know more than we do” and “you’re not to think that you 
can teach us anything” (Store Norske Leksikon, 2005-2007). A manager who thinks more of 
himself than his subordinates would not be well accepted in Norwegian organizations.  As we 
elaborated in chapter five, decision-making has to go through the entire organization, with 
discussion and dialog. A decision cannot be made inclusively by the manager. Pure 
commando, strong hierarchies, or authoritative or paternalistic management would not be a 
match with the Norwegian values such as openness, transparency and closeness (Sejersted, 
1997, p. 45, ref in. Hagen & Trygstad, 2007, p. 35, Falkum & Bygdås, 2012).  
This is in strong contrast to French expectations, where the hierarchies lead to a completely 
different, but shared understanding of roles. “With the different levels you know where you 
belong, and it is being demonstrated very clearly. You are at different levels in the hierarchy 
It is not natural with near contact between the levels” (Informant no.3).  
 
A very interesting aspect between Norway and France is how they both value equality 
(Mangset, 2004). It infiltrates both societies, but the perceptions of the term are quite 
different. Mangset (2004) suggests that the French type of equality is more formal. As long as 
everyone has the some opportunities, “equality” is functioning. This is evident in for example 
education, where free universities are supposed to give every student the same opportunities 
to become whatever they want. In the end, only your own skills should decide where you get 
a job, and later end up in the hierarchy. This might help explain why even people who didn’t 
attend a Grandes Ecoles support the uneven distribution of status, in favor to those who 
actually went. It’s considered right by the society that the students with highest competence 
and intelligence are assigned the highest position, as they have the best qualifications 
(Mangset, 2004). It’s an equality based on chance equality (Mangset, 2004), which approves a 
strong organizational hierarchy by the entire society.  In strong contrast, Norwegian equality 
is more egalitarian. Norwegians doesn’t seem to approve that competence should result in 
more power or privileges than justified by the position in the organization, since it is low 
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accept for social inequality (Mangset, 2004). This is also evident in the Norwegian education 
system, where concept of adjusted teaching is embedded (Utdanningsdirektoratet, 2014). The 
idea is to meet every student at his or her level, and give him or her acceptable challenges. 
This way, every student is included and the personal level of skills will not crucial. This is in 
accordance with our informants’ descriptions of low power distance, flat organizational 
structures and closeness. It will again lead to a more personal trust. Also Levin et al. (2012) 
supports Mangset’s (2004) thoughts. He states that a fundamental aspect of the Norwegian 
work life is the moderate meaning of formal authority. The Norwegian ideal of equality 
diminishes the desires associated with hierarchies, especially the ones that are characterized 
by great diversions in influence and salaries. In Norwegian work life there is usually not 
doubt who the manager is, but the authority is carried with a certain discretion (Levin et al., 
2012, p. 194).  
 
7.2.3 The Cultural-Cognitive Pillar 
This pillar is concerned with a shared conception, which constitutes social reality and creates 
the frames through which meaning is made. It takes a closer look at what we often take for 
granted. “Mediating between the external world of stimuli and the response of the individual 
organism is a collection of internalized symbolic representations of the world” (Scott, 2008, 
p. 57). It concerns the meaning we attribute to symbols, gests and signs in our surroundings. 
The internal interpretive processes of the world are shaped by an external cultural framework. 
It is the culture that creates mental patterns for thought, emotions and action (Scott, 2008). It 
leads to a state of mind that causes us to say “that’s just the way things are done around here”. 
We discussed this earlier in this chapter, under general theories of neo institutionalism, as the 
cultural-cognitive pillar shares many of the same aspects (Scott, 2008).  
 
An interesting description shared by several of our informants was working hours in both 
France and Norway. In France, there seems to be a general understanding that you do not 
leave work earlier than your superior. It doesn’t matter if you are finished with your tasks, 
you simply don’t leave; that is not how things are done around there.  
It’s the aspect of time, where you have very long days, they work much more than in 
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Norway. There are kind of these rules, you are not supposed to leave before your boss 
and if you leave before 6, you will be looked upon as a “draft dodger”, or that you 
don’t take the work seriously (Informant no.1). 
 
The informant states that they are more concerned with being present, than the work.  
In Norway on the other hand, people have a more flexible attitude related to daily working 
hours. “Norwegians are more likely to shovel away work, a bit more “skippertak”. To do as 
much as possible within a short period of time. It works for us”. Norwegians value their 
leisure time, and try to be effective at work in order to leave earlier. A more flexible work life 
therefore tends to create an acceptance that, as long as you do what you are supposed to do the 
number of hours spent has secondary importance (within reason of course) “In Norway it’s 
more like it’s the time you’re efficient that matters. It’s ok if you arrive at work at 7 am and 
then leave early, because you did what you were supposed to and used the working time” 
(Informant no.6). The managers have trust in their subordinates to not leave before their work 
is done, as he trusts them to share his visions. This is consistent with an identification-based 
trust, which is based on identification with other’s desires and intentions (Lewicki & Bunker, 
1996). The managers and employees come to truly understand each other, which could mean 
that an employee would never leave unfinished work. It also fits with a transformational 
management, where the manager is concerned with influencing his subordinates. This was 
further explained in chapter six.  
 
7.3 Rationality  
Weber defined rationality in our theory chapter as how to attribute meaning to your actions 
and behavior. These meanings can have different content, depending on the environmental 
surroundings and cultural/societal expectations. This is an explanation to why decision-
making and trust relations differ between France and Norway. It’s more rational, that is - it’s 
more meaningful - to behave in accordance with calculus-based trust in France. The 
environment is permeated with an impersonal trust. It doesn’t make any sense to try to 
develop personal relations in such an environment, and it might be difficult to build trust 
based on knowledge, when no knowledge is shared. In the same way, this type of behavior 
would have no meaning in a Norwegian organization. The surroundings are infiltrated with 
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expectations of personal trust, which is also evident in the organizations. We argue that when 
you operate in an environment with high trust, it is also easier to advance to knowledge-based 
and identification-based trust. They both rest on assumptions that you have to have 
knowledge about the other actor in order to truly understand and identify them. This leads to a 
predictability, which also makes it easier to invest trust. Actors get to see and learn about each 
other in different contexts, in order to be even better at predicting behavior. 
 
Earlier in our study we have suggested to describe French organizations as full rational 
seeking, and Norwegian organizations as more calculative, but in acceptance of bounded 
rationality. In his article, Redmond (2004) introduces a third type of rationality, namely 
institutional rationality. He states that it requires two ways of thinking or rationale; one that 
produce rule-following behavior and one that produce purpose-seeking behavior. These are 
also consistent with Weber’s goal oriented and value oriented rationalities, described in 
chapter three. Cognitive efforts are involved with the assumptions of institutional rationality. 
Redmond (2004) states that behavior that is pre-descripted doesn’t really require that much 
cognitive effort. This is in line with our earlier descriptions of French organizations as full 
rationality seeking. We do not state that the French do not appreciate cognitive thinking; 
rather we argue that the French seek predictability, compliance, low risk and full rationality. 
This leads to a sort of organizational life where following the set institutional rules 
(rationales) becomes more vital than cognitive effort. Hence the trust relations are calculus-
based, you trust each other to follow the rules and do what you have said you will.  This is 
also consistent with the description of personal and impersonal trust. It is easily done to 
assume that a trust of more personal grounds would require a bigger cognitive effort. This is 
all linked to cultural-cognitive pillar in that the way that: “human thinking and acting are 
governed by rules which have, by a process of selection, evolved in the context of society” 
(Ehrlich 2000, ref. in Redmond, 2004, p. 176). The cultural and societal surroundings are 
what lead to the specific form of rationality, and then trust relations.  
 
On the other side, the type of rationality that includes more planning needs more cognitive 
effort, as purpose seeking can be demanding (Redmond, 2004). If the purposes of several 
actors have to be considered, in contrast to a situation of overall general rule following, one 
79 
 
can easily imagine a more challenging rationality. We argue that Norwegian organizational 
life is not necessarily characterized by diverging purposes, but rather the fact that every 
individual are to be united and considered in terms of decision-making. This is embedded in 
laws and regulation in the societal surroundings, such as the Work Environment Act. They are 
all to be acknowledged, as transformational management requires, and every individual 
functions in different ways. Redmond (2004) also says that it is possible to converse effort 
with this rationality by learning from others and their experiences, and to work together. This 
is consistent with what our informants have shared about Norwegian work life. It is costly to 
go through every new situation by yourself. We let Redmond summarize this sections: “.  
“Because we have inherited institutionally rational minds we are predisposed to create and to 
depend on an enormous range and variety of institutions, which collectively constitute the 
"great flywheel of society”” (Redmond, 2004, p. 186).  
 
7.4 Summarizing Comments 
To summarize, we argue that the regulative pillar is the most dominant in French 
organizations, with both formal and informal rules. In Norway, the cultural-cognitive and 
normative seem to have more dominance. These conclusions are based on the previous 
analysis, and what our informants have shared as simply their expectations. If aspects from 
the regulative pillar had been more dominant in Norwegian organizations, it wouldn’t have 
been consistent with the employees’ expectations of work life. It would be harder for them to 
predict wants, as well as future behavior, from their colleagues. In the same way, French 
employees could have been insecure if a manager all of the sudden operated with closeness 
and expected them to chitchat. The worlds-in-common in respectively France and Norway 
provides expectations of future behavior, and societal values help accepting them. Even 
though the two countries operate with different types of trust, respectively calculus-based and 
identification-based, it still provides a predictability in both countries that facilitates behavior. 
It also guides managers. It could be discussed if France would have less trust if the regulative 
pillar was less dominant, as the society and culture could be said to support its existing 
dominance. We do argue that the regulative pillar is more dominant and fits better with the 
society, which leads to the highest possible amount of trust for the French. Trust and 
predictability are connected. In the same way, aspects from the normative and cultural-
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cognitive pillar are a better fit for Norwegian organizations, where norms and rules such as 
equality and inclusion infiltrate the society.  
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8 Conclusion 
Throughout this study, we have examined trust relations in French and Norwegian 
organizations in order to answer our research question. In this chapter, we will conclude by 
presenting summarizing comments. We will also suggest to integrate the theoretical 
approaches. The assumptions made in the introduction were: 
1. We assume that trust relations will be different in French and Norwegian 
organizations. 
2. We assume the institutional environment and management style will differ in French 
and Norwegian organizations. 
3. Trust in its daily connotation will be of less importance in French organizations than 
in Norwegian’s.   
 
All of the assumptions were to a large extent verified. We have shown that trust relations are 
quite different in French and Norwegian organizations. We have identified an impersonal and 
calculus-based trust in French organizations, which mainly fits with Scott’s regulative pillar. 
In Norway, personal and knowledge-based – even identification-based – trust has been 
identified, which mainly seems to be in accordance with the normative and cultural-cognitive 
pillar. We have argued that transactional management style creates conditions for an 
impersonal trust, while transformational facilitates for a more personal trust. As a conclusion, 
an organization’s institutional environment and management style will affect both the level 
and form of trust. This is evident through for example decision-making processes.  
 
8.1 Summarizing Our Main Findings  
We have highlighted elements of neo institutionalism and transactional and transformational 
management, which have proven to create certain conditions that affect trust relations. 
General theories of rationality and interviews concerning decision-making have illustrated 
how these relations can appear, and how actors attribute logic to it. Descriptions of French 
and Norwegian work life, mainly based on laws, education and culture, have been used to 
explain the different management styles. Based on our examination, it seems that the form 
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and level of trust differs in French and Norwegian organizations. We want to start this chapter 
by presenting the study’s main findings within each theoretical framework.  
Our findings of decision-making processes in Norway and France show that the processes 
seem to be characterized by two different forms of rationality. Based on our informants’ 
statements as well as existing literature, it can be argued that the constant strive for full 
rationality in French decision making processes is caused by a low level of trust in the 
organizations, since complete information would make trust superfluous (Bachmannn, 2003, 
p. 60). On the other hand, the decision-making processes in Norwegian organizations are 
characterized by limited rationality. Decision-making was described as more pragmatic, open 
and risk seeking, which are all factors that indicate this form for rationality. The inclusion of 
employees and trade union representatives in decision-making processes are important 
conditions for trust to establish at higher levels.  
 
The theories of transformational and transactional management were used to illustrate how 
management and trust are related. The theoretical framework emphasizes two different types 
of logics that captured some central aspects respectively of the French and Norwegian 
managers. Our analysis show that a transactional management contributes to trust relations 
characterized by calculus- based trust, which support our assumptions. The exchange 
relationship, based on sanctions and rewards, promotes a behavior where promoting oneself 
seems to be the rational thing to do. Knowledge as an object of exchange is seen as an 
important resource to power, and you might weaken your position in the relationship by 
sharing knowledge. Because of this, one important condition for the development of trust – 
knowledge sharing - is rare. Trust is simplified to compliance; one may trust each other 
because of the existing control mechanism. For this reason, we argue that the trust relations in 
French organizations have a form of impersonal trust. Managers and employees have few 
incentives to invest in the effort of developing a personal form for trust. This is not 
necessarily the case for the entire organization, - it seems like the trust relations in the 
informal networks are more developed. Information sharing and predetermined trust are 
conditions that facilitates to even higher levels of trust. We assumed that in Norwegian 
organizations, trust relations would take more of a personal form. It’s likely to be established 
at knowledge-based level, and in some cases at identification- based level. Our analysis shows 
that it’s especially the openness, low power distance, employee participation and work 
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processes in the organization that stabilizes trust relations at these levels.  The integrated 
system of employee participation creates an understanding of the organizations as a whole 
and contributes to shared values and goals, which have to be in place for trust to develop to 
identification- based level. This will also enhance a personal form for trust. Our analysis 
shows that the transactional and transformational management, not only shape the trust 
relations between managers and employee, but also between employees.  
The use of neo institutional theory and Scott’s three pillars illustrated how different 
institutional aspects dominate in respectively French and Norwegian organizations. We have 
argued that in France, regulations, possible sanctions and informal roles are the most 
dominating factors when it comes to regulating and constraining behavior. This is consistent 
with Scott’s regulative pillar. We have also argued that it leads to a calculus-based and 
impersonal trust. The factors from the regulative pillar are less directly decisive in Norwegian 
organizations, where laws like the Model of Collaboration and the Work Environment Act 
function more as a foundation for trust. Employee participation helps to keep the entire 
organization on board, with shared norms and values. High level of trust, flat organizational 
structure and closeness between managers and employees lead to a world-in-common where 
expectations of inclusion is high. In France, there seems to be both expected and accepted that 
top executives and managers from Grandes Ecoles constitute an elite with a lot of power. This 
reality is supported by societal values, where an instinctive elite to perform important tasks 
are seen as a necessity. 
 
8.2 Integrating the Theoretical Frameworks 
The theoretical frameworks were chosen to illuminate our assumptions from several 
perspectives. However, it is also possible to integrate them in one discussion, as they share 
some basic similarities. Trust relations are obviously not depending on only management 
style or only institutions, and a true understanding of them cannot be explained simply by 
studying decision-making. The chosen theories have complemented each other, and we argue 
that it is possible to obtain a deeper understanding by integrating them. For example, 
management style is in constant interaction with the institutional frameworks. Not only are 
they mutual dependent, but they also sustain and enhance one another. They also promote and 
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restrict which behavior that is considered rational. As Sørhaug (1996, p. 48) states, the 
manager administrates and express the organizations legitimacy, power and resources. The 
manager regulates the organization’s inner and outer limits, meaning the relationship between 
departments, positions and between formal and informal organizing (Sørhaug 1996, p.45). We 
see that an integrated perspective facilitates for a more complete understanding.  
 
8.2.1 A last Illustration to Our Point 
To verify this interdependent relationship of theories, we will envision a French manager 
being placed in a Norwegian organization, and discuss possible outcomes. A French manager 
with a transactional logic is likely to meet challenges in a democratic, low power distance 
organization. The most likely exclusion of employees in decision-making processes would not 
be accepted, either by the Norwegian employees, or the trade unions representatives. 
Exclusion would be in opposition to Norwegian employees’ expectations and norms – it 
would even break the laws concerning employee participation. Since power in Norwegian 
organizations is to a large extent shared with the employees, an exclusion of the employees 
wouldn’t be sustainable. The managers’ legitimacy in Norway is based on the support of the 
employees; it’s likely that the French management style would lead to loss of legitimacy. In 
other words, in the institutional environment in Norwegian organizations, maintenance of 
French management style wouldn’t be rational.  
As a possible result, transactional management supported by the regulative pillar can lead to 
mistrust in Norwegian organizations. Further, transactional management doesn’t encourage 
closeness and equality, which are values well embedded in Norwegian society, and thus in 
organizations. The French manager and the Norwegian employees wouldn’t share a world-in-
common, where norms and rules would be agreed upon and followed, without being 
sanctioned. Each other’s behaviors would be anchored in completely different rationalities. A 
French manager’s action would make sense for him, but it might be comprehended as 
unpredictable by Norwegian employees. A management style characterized by control, power 
and elitism is likely to be challenged by the Norwegian Model of Collaboration. The Model of 
Collaboration is based on reciprocity and cooperation between all three parties, and the 
French management syle could disrupt this harmony. The Norwegian employees’ rationality 
would be created in a completely different institutional environment than a French manager. 
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They would accept and expect different behavior from each other, which would limit trust 
development. 
  
8.3 Reciprocity?  
An element that implicitly recurs in all of our theories is the concept of reciprocity. In 
sociology the term refers to an intermediate between self-interest and altruism (Noteboom & 
Six, 2003). Putnam (2000, p. 134, ref. in Noteboom & Six, 2003) suggests to characterize this 
as a short-term altruism for long-term self-interest. We argue that it could be seen in 
management theories, as employees and managers are in a mutual dependent relationship. 
They have to acknowledge each other in one way or another, either as simply based on 
exchange or as equal associates in an organization. Reciprocity will strengthen and produce 
trust (Sørhaug 2004). In the same way, a low degree of trust would break the rules of 
reciprocity.  
 
Generalized trust, which we have located in Norway, creates a basis for reciprocity. It is 
visualized in the different laws and agreements in Norway, and in transformational 
management. The Norwegian Model of Collaboration facilitates for reciprocal trust between 
the included parts. The notion of employee’s direct participation in the model also encourages 
reciprocity. The employees have to actively gain knowledge, and the manager has to facilitate 
for participation. The parts are mutually depending on each other’s actions. Reciprocity is not 
found to the same degree in France, due to lacking channels of influence in organizations for 
employees and low degree of participation in decision-making. Also, a provision of 
information based on trust, which is seen in transformational management, open decision-
making processes and Norwegian institutions, can start a positive dynamic of trust 
(Noteboom, 2003). It could be argued that the French organizations are characterized by a 
more one- way dimension rather than reciprocity, which seems to be supported by the elitist 
value in society. In addition, the French decision-making process has shown to not be filled 
with much reciprocity as employees are not included or informed. On the other hand, 
transactional management is based on an exchange, which could be discussed is reciprocity as 
both parties gain something. Also, Gouldner (1954 ref. in Vos & Wielers, 2003) states that 
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reciprocity can be present in all institutionalized sectors, even the most rationalized. Still, Vos 
& Wielers (2003) state that people who are involved in a relationship based on reciprocity 
doesn’t have a calculative attitude towards outcomes of the relationship. Also, actors engaged 
in a reciprocal relationship expect from each other that they respond to each other’s needs 
(Vos & Wielers, 2003, p. 85). Thus, French organizations function the way they do, as the 
predictability of other actor’s future behavior are institutionalized and regulated by the 
transactional relationship.  
 
The notion of reciprocity got our attention after we integrated our theories. It could be used to 
explain and investigate our findings in a new way. The integration of the theories also creates 
wonders and assumptions that could lay foundation for future research.  
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Appendix A 
 
Intervjuguide 
Understreke at vi er studenter fra UiO som skriver masteroppgave i Organisasjon ledelse og 
arbeid. Vi skriver om norske lederes utfordringer i møte/samarbeid med andre kulturer, og har 
da valgt å se nærmere på norske ledere i fransk kontekst, altså bedrifter. Vi er spesielt opptatt 
av ulike former for tillit og hvordan dette skapes og vedvares.  
 
Hva er vi ute etter – vi er ute etter beskrivelser, opplevelser, historier, eksempler. 
NB til oss selv: spør fortløpende om konkrete eksempler.  
 
Del 1 – standardspørsmål 
1.     Hvem vedkommende er; rolle i organisasjonen, hvor lang fartstid, både i   Norge, 
Frankrike og i ulike organisasjoner etc. 
2.     Hvilket ledernivå? 
3.     Alder, og hvor lenge har du arbeidet i Norge? Frankrike i lederstilling? 
4.     Hvor lenge har du jobbet i nåværende organisasjon? 
5.     Hvorfor dro du til Frankrike? (Om det var eget ønske). 
 
Del 2 – det større bildet 
6. Kan du kort fortelle om din oppfatning av norsk lederstil og arbeidsliv? 
(Hvis treigt, prøve komme inn på hva vi vet fra teorien. ”Vår hypotese er at” det er bygget på 
kort distanse mellom ansatte og ledere, tillit, konsensus, medbestemmelse, etc) 
 
7. Kan du fortelle litt om din oppfatning av fransk lederstil? Fransk organisasjonsliv? Fransk 
organisasjonsstruktur?  
- sosiale relasjoner på jobb 
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8. Har du opplevd noen konkrete forskjeller i å jobbe i en fransk organisasjon, fra en norsk?  
 
10.  Hva er din oppfatning av fagforeningene? Hvilken rolle spiller tillitsvalgt i franske 
organisasjoner?  
 
11. Hvordan foregår eventuelle forhandlinger? 
 
12. Kan du fortelle om beslutningsprosesser i franske organisasjoner. Hvem er inkludert? Hva 
vektlegges?  
 
13. Etter en beslutning er tatt, hvordan blir den gjennomført? Kommunisert, oppfølging, 
styring?  
 
14. Hva opplever du som den største forskjellen mellom norsk og fransk arbeidsliv? Er dette 
også den største utfordringen? 
 
15. Hva oppfatter du som de største forskjellene mellom ledelse på norsk og ledelse på 
fransk?  
 
16. Har du opplevd noen språkbarrierer?  
 
Del 3 – det konkrete om tillit  
17. Hvis du tenker på tillit i organisasjoner. Hva betyr det for deg? 
 
18. Hva mener du skaper og opprettholder tillit i franske organisasjoner? 
 
19. Hva mener du skaper og opprettholder tillit i norske organisasjoner? 
 
20. Hvor “ligger” tilliten i franske organisasjoner? 
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21. Har du opplevd tilfeller av mistillit. Hva forårsaket dette? Hva ble gjort for skape tillit? 
 
22. Hvordan bygges tillitsrelasjoner opp og virker i henholdsvis norsk og fransk arbeidsliv  
 
Avslutningsvis 
Er det noe du vil legge til? Noe du tror vi har godt av å vite? 
  
 
